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Map 1: Afghanistan
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) iChronically poor  those who are persistently below the poverty line
Financial assets stocks of cash, such as credit or savings that can be used to produce or
purchase goods
Gilims traditional Afghan flat weave rugs
Household smallest unit living in a compound; usually husband, wife and dependent
children
Human assets the education and health level of individuals and populations
Jerib one jerib equals 2000 square metres
Kabuli Jerib this is the official government area of a jerib; the local unit of a jerib
may differ in terms of metric equivalence
Livelihood a livelihood is defined here as the assets, activities and access that
determine the living gained by an individual of a household
LSP CG the LSP CG facilitates interaction between government, donors, UN
agencies and NGOs on livelihoods and social protection
Manteqa local domain, territory, area
MISFA this is a World Bank and MRRD initiative aimed at developing microfinance
services in Afghanistan
Natural assets  the natural resource base (e.g. land, water, trees) that yields products
used by human populations for their survival or income
NABDP this is a government led programme that aims to enable provincial and
district level institutions to implement national level priorities and
programmes, and to provide a framework for public investment
NEEP this is a national programme that aims to generate person-days of minimum
wage employment through labour-intensive public works in order to
protect the livelihoods of the poor
Non-farm labour labour that is not involved in agriculture
NRVA National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment
NSP this is a programme that aims to develop the abilities of communities to
plan, manage, finance and monitor their own development programmes
through strengthening local governance, building leadership within villages
and neighbourhoods and providing assistance for rehabilitation and
development to communities
Glossary
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) ivNSS this is a nationwide initiative involving UN, NGOs, donors and the Afghan
government aimed at providing understanding of food security, vulnerability,
nutrition and coping strategies among households in Afghanistan
Off-farm labour labour that is associated with agriculture but is not involved in cultivation,
for example, crop processing
Physical assets   assets brought into existence by economic production processes (e.g.,
tools, machines, irrigation canals)
Seers seven kilograms
Shura village council
Social assets social networks people participate in, from which they can derive support
that contributes to their livelihoods
Vulnerability high degree of exposure to risks, shocks and stress
Wuliswali district
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) vThis report presents the findings and
implications of an 18-month Rural Livelihoods
Monitoring Research Project. The Afghanistan
Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) and
seven partner non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) implemented the research project,
which involved the monitoring of 390
households in 21 villages in seven districts in
seven provinces. Information was gathered
at the village and household level on human,
financial, physical and natural assets, with
the aim of building understanding of rural
livelihoods in Afghanistan and improving the
monitoring and evaluation capacity of partner
NGOs. This summary presents the key findings,
implications and recommendations from this
research.
Key findings, implications and
recommendations
Livelihoods diversity
The majority of households, both rich and
poor, have diversified income sources and
many are involved in a combination of farm
and non-farm activities. For wealthier
households livelihood diversity is usually a
strategy of accumulation, while for poorer
households diversity is more of a coping
mechanism.
The Government of Afghanistan (GoA), United
Nations (UN) agencies, donors and NGOs
should ensure that their activities support
the multiple income strategies that poor
households use and not encourage
dependence on one sector, such as
agriculture, as a livelihoods source. One way
forward could be to design activities that
support an entire household, rather than an
individual.
Non-farm labour
For the poorest groups in 18 out of the 21
villages studied, non-farm labour was the
most important source of income. The current
importance of non-farm labour has significant
Executive Summary
implications for the agricultural focus of
much rural programming and policy in
Afghanistan.
The GoA, UN agencies, donors and NGOs must
recognise and support the importance of non-
farm labour in rural livelihoods and look to:
• Monitor over time employment trends
at the local level;
• Examine and support the skills people
already possess;
• Build an understanding of the skills
needed for non-farm labour for men and
women;
• Explore providing skills training as part
of public works programmes; and
• Ensure that national programmes directly
benefit women and also develop women
oriented strategies.
Labour migration
For over a quarter of all households labour
migration, both inside and outside
Afghanistan, is a critical income strategy. For
wealthier households labour migration may
be a strategy of accumulation. However, for
the poor it is a crucial way of coping with
uneven job opportunities inside the village
and a way of seeking better-paid work.
The GoA, UN, donors and NGOs alike need
to begin to view migration in a more positive
light, rather than something negative that
should be prevented, and undertake research
on labour migration to provide a better
understanding of why people migrate, where
they migrate, how they migrate, etc.
Indebtedness
Many households are indebted, rich and poor
alike, and indebtedness is a factor in both
the creation as well as the perpetuation of
poverty. For wealthier households, loans are
often taken either for ceremonies such as
weddings, where a large lump sum is needed,
or for the purposes of production and
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majority of loans are taken out as a coping
strategy to meet basic needs such as food
and health care. Policy makers and
practitioners, particularly from the
government and microfinance providers
should:
• Explore and monitor locally existing credit
mechanisms;
• Monitor the level of indebtedness;
• Consider moving part of the money
currently allocated for targeted transfers
to the poorest to the MicroFinance
Investment and Support Facility for
Afghanistan (MISFA); and
• Study the possibilities of helping people
recover assets.
Gender
Women in rural Afghanistan are involved in
many production and income generating
activities that contribute to the overall
household income. However, very few women
own resources such as land and livestock,
and their income generating options are fewer
in comparison to men. It is these inequities
that make some female-headed households
particularly vulnerable to poverty, as there
are few activities that they can do which are
sufficient to support a family.
Policy makers and practitioners from the
government, donors and implementing
organisations need to:
• Protect, support and develop the
livelihoods of women;
• Recognise and support women’s role in
agriculture at the policy and programme
level; and
• Tackle the structural causes of gender
inequity and look beyond traditional
activities, such as poultry farming and
embroidery.
Health
For the majority of households, health care
is the second largest area of expenditure.
Health is a livelihoods and social protection
issue in that ill health, either physical or
mental, has an enormous impact on
livelihoods. Ill health is a major factor in
creating indebtedness and leads to a depletion
of assets, as households sell their assets to
pay for health treatment. Ill health also
impacts on livelihoods, as the person who is
ill (and possibly their carer) is unable to
engage in income generating activities.
Health is also tied up with livelihoods through
the negative effects of certain income
generating activities such as carpet weaving
or embroidery and because of the health risks
associated with labour migration. Despite all
of the above, the Ministry of Health (MoH) is
not part of the Livelihoods and Social
Protection Consultative Group (LSP CG).
The government, the LSP CG and/or
implementing organisations should:
• Include the MoH on the LSP CG and
institutionalise linkages between health
and livelihoods and social protection;
• Provide advice on livelihood related
health issues in heath education
activities; and
• More closely control pharmaceuticals
and pharmacies to prevent the sale of
ineffective medicine and ensure that
drugs and antibiotics are only available
by prescription.
Social Protection and the Poorest of the
Poor
Most current policy and programmes do not
target the very poor, who are likely to be
those who are unable to work, lack assets,
and obtain grain through begging. For women,
those who are married too much older men
are particularly vulnerable to poverty. While
the Livelihoods and Social Protection (LSP)
Annex of the Security Afghanistan’s Futures
(SAF) document has empowerment of the
most vulnerable as an aim, the programmes
encompassed within the LSP are unlikely to
reach the most vulnerable. The annex does
recognise the need to understand and work
with traditional mechanisms of support, for
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 2
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strategy for doing this appears to have been
developed.
Policy makers and practitioners in government
ministries and/or NGOs should:
• Target resources to households with
young children in which adults are not
able to work;
• Use community workers to raise
awareness of the long-term livelihoods
consequence of women marrying much
older men; and
• Build greater understanding of traditional
social support mechanisms.
Agriculture
A majority of poor households access most
of their grain from the market or from other
means, and non-farm labour, rather than
agriculture, is their most important source
of income. This raises questions over the
accuracy of the frequently cited “80 percent
of the population is dependent on
agriculture.”  The findings of this research
have major ramifications for agricultural
policy and programming, as they demonstrate
that the needs of the rural poor are currently
being missed by the focus on agriculture.
Policy makers and practitioners need to
recognise the discrepancy between the
realities of rural livelihoods and the policy
and programme focus on agriculture and:
• Distinguish between the asset portfolios
of different rural households and
individuals; and
• Understand the different natural resource
base which households have access to
before designing agricultural programmes
Livelihoods monitoring
The findings of this research demonstrate
the importance of monitoring livelihood
trends. The majority of the NGOs who
participated in this project found what they
learned to be very valuable in assessing
whether their programmes are responding to
the realities of people’s lives, especially
those of the poor. However, NGOs and their
donors need to begin to look more at the
outcomes (effects) of their projects and
programmes, and where possible the impacts,
rather than focusing on outputs. Long-term
funding and investment in learning is also
required to enable NGOs and others to begin
to look at and tackle the causes of livelihood
constraints and not only the symptoms.
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 3
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that have emerged from the Afghanistan
Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) Rural
Livelihoods Monitoring Research Project. The
European Commission (EC) funded this project
and AREU and seven partner non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) conducted
the research.1 It involved the monitoring of
390 households2 in 21 villages in seven districts
in seven provinces (see Appendix 1 for a
description of each village included in this
study).
The aim of the project was to build
understanding of rural livelihoods in
Afghanistan as well as to improve the
1.  Introduction
monitoring and evaluation capacity of partner
NGOs. Information was gathered at the village
and household level on human (education,
skills and health), financial (stocks of cash,
such as credit or savings that can be used to
produce or buy goods), physical (e.g., tools,
machines, irrigation canals), natural (e.g.,
land, water, trees) and social (support
networks) assets.
The Rural Livelihoods Monitoring Research
Project was conceived prior to September
2001 and had its origins in the inter-related
Principled Common Programming3 and
Strategic Framework for Afghanistan
1 AKDN (Aga Khan Development Network), CHA (Coordination for Humanitarian Assistance) together with EOCA (Ecumenical
Office of Christian Aid), CARE (CARE International), DACAAR (Danish Committee for Assistance to Afghan Refugees), GAA
(German Agro Action) and MC (Mercy Corps).
2 Household is defined here as the smallest unit living in a compound, usually consisting of a husband, wife and their dependent
children or other dependents.
3 Principled Common Programming was the idea that UN agencies, NGOs and donors would apply common and agreed goals
and principles to their programmes and projects. The goals and principles were to be based on the five strategic objectives
of the Strategic Framework for Afghanistan.
4 The Strategic Framework for Afghanistan was a policy framework approved by the UN Secretary-General in September 1998
that defined “principles, goals and institutional arrangements for a more coherent, effective and integrated political
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for the project was the observation that
humanitarian action was generally not
informed by a detailed understanding of rural
livelihoods and that aid practice paid little
attention to learning, and instead primarily
emphasised delivery of aid built on
assumptions about the significance of
agriculture in rural livelihoods.5  The project
was implemented in the post-2001 context,
with its emphasis on state building,
reconstruction and development, and a
substantially greater scale of funding and
action than before. Policy and programming
decisions, in this environment, were still
constrained by a lack of understanding and
knowledge gained through systematic
research. A good example of this is the policy
and programming narrative surrounding the
collapse of agricultural production in
Afghanistan, which was so widely articulated
in the post-2001 environment, and influenced
much of the immediate response. More
importantly, while there has been a rebound
of agricultural production, there has been
no corresponding transformation of rural
livelihoods or reduction in rural poverty. This
lack of transformation undermines the implicit
assumption linking wheat production and
rural livelihoods, which has provided the
foundation for many rural agricultural policies
and programmes. This assumption is reflected
most commonly in the statement, “80% of
rural Afghans depend on agriculture.”
A fundamental objective of this report is to
move beyond and challenge untested
assumptions and statements to explore the
complexities of rural livelihoods based on
empirical evidence from the field. By
presenting and analysing field-based evidence,
this report aims to influence policy and
programming at the government and agency
level, and thereby contribute to one of the
government’s key objectives – building
sustainable livelihoods for rural Afghans.
The bulk of this report provides an analysis
and interpretation of the panel household
data collected by AREU and the seven partner
NGOs. The report focuses particularly on
cross-site evidence at the village and wealth
group level, with some rather more selective
use of household data to investigate
differences within wealth groups. More
detailed site-specific analysis, with immediate
programming implications, rests with the
individual agencies.6 In addition, this report
draws on three case studies on seed
distribution, gender roles in agriculture and
village institutions, which were undertaken
as part of the Rural Livelihoods Monitoring
Research Project.
In constructing a panel set of data, it was
hoped that this would provide the basis for
tracking changes in livelihoods over time.
While this report does discuss some indicative
data, it is not possible to go into more detail
in relation to longitudinal trends. However,
if the Rural Livelihoods Monitoring Research
Project is to contribute to longer-term
understanding of rural change in Afghanistan,
then this panel data set provides the means
by which it can be achieved. In this regard,
three NGO partners involved in the project
plan to continue monitoring the same
households over time.
The next chapter provides an overview of
the context within which this research has
been undertaken and highlights the emerging
policy agenda for which the evidence
presented in this report has important
ramifications. Chapter three then focuses on
the methods employed during the Rural
Livelihoods Monitoring Research Project and
includes a description of the sample frame.
Chapter four provides a detailed discussion
of the evidence collected from this project
in relation to livelihoods, and is followed by
a concluding chapter that presents key policy
and programming implications and
recommendations arising from the evidence.
5 Pain, A., and Lautze, S. Addressing Livelihoods in Afghanistan. Kabul: AREU. 2002.
6 For example see Kerr-Wilson, A., and Pain, A. Three Villages in Laghman: A Case Study of Rural Livelihoods. Kabul: AREU.
2004.
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In the last two and a half years, since the
Bonn Agreement was signed on 5 December
2001, the changes in Afghanistan in terms of
the policy and programming environment
have been immense. During the Taliban era
there was an effective policy vacuum, while
throughout the country drought and
displacement were widespread. In
comparison, the last two years have seen a
major movement of people back to
Afghanistan, a lifting of the drought in many
parts of the country, and a recovery in
agricultural production that has led to an
unprecedented harvest of wheat estimated
to be 4.35 million metric tons in 2003. Poppy
cultivation has also expanded from seven
provinces in 1994 to 28 provinces in 2003,
although the 80,000 hectares cultivated in
2003 still only represents one percent of the
total arable area of Afghanistan and less than
three percent of the irrigated area.7
Despite the growth of the opium economy,
the realities under which most Afghans live
their lives are austere, and everyday rural
life is characterised by extreme risk and deep
levels of poverty and deprivation. Key
indicators of poverty in Afghanistan consist
of low food consumption levels, including
evidence of a significant number of Afghans
existing below 2,100 calories per day, and a
lack of access to education and health
services, particularly to safe drinking water.
Moreover, in terms of national level statistics
– under-five mortality rates, maternal
mortality and other health statistics –
Afghanistan is firmly towards the bottom of
international rankings. An environment of
insecurity, violence and impunity compounds
all of this, and it is in many ways surprising
that the situation for most Afghans is not
worse. The fact that it is not is due in part
to the resilience of Afghan livelihoods, which
remain poorly understood.
Against this backdrop, an emerging
government has been attempting to build its
authority and reach, and has received ongoing
support from an expanded presence of
external assistance actors. It has struggled
against a legacy and continuation of many
of the elements of chronic conflict and
political instability that have characterised
Afghanistan over the last thirty years. From
the post-2001 “crisis” scenario, which drove
the immediate government and assistance
community response, the threads of policy
and strategy have gradually come together,
starting with the National Development
Framework (NDF) of April 2002.
The NDF lays out a vision for Afghanistan’s
future, establishes a set of priorities through
a series of programmes and identifies broad
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development strategy has three main
components or pillars, as these have been
termed. The first pillar focuses on
humanitarian assistance and social policy and
is concerned with achieving social protection
and enabling conditions for people to live
secure lives. The second pillar focuses on
addressing physical reconstruction and the
development of natural resources, and the
third deals with private sector development.
Underlying the NDF is a premise that the
process of state building and reconstruction
will be based on private sector led growth,
in which agriculture will play a critical role.
The private sector, furthermore, is seen as
making social inclusion possible by creating
economic opportunities for Afghans. The
Afghan state, in comparison, is to be “light”
and “enabling,” with responsibility for
creating appropriate regulatory frameworks.
Community-driven development provides both
the mechanism for accountability and the
vehicle for social change.
This framework has recently been developed
and elaborated into a substantial policy
document, “Securing Afghanistan’s Future
(SAF): Accomplishments and Strategic Path
Forward.” The development of this document
occurred at the same time as an extensive
recosting exercise, with respect to budgetary
projections and the level of external support
Afghanistan requires in the medium-term
(the SAF argues that Afghanistan needs US$28
billion over the coming seven years). The SAF
also sets out in detail the proposed linkages
between planned levels of economic growth,
the development of the three pillars and
their programme content, and strategies of
implementation.
Key arguments within the SAF relate to the
importance of economic growth rates of nine
percent per annum, so that economic
development and social investment can ensure
the support of communities for the
government. The SAF further argues that this
level of growth is required to raise per capita
incomes from their current estimated level
of US$200 per head to US$500 in ten years
time. According to the SAF, this magnitude
of growth will assist in crowding out the
opium poppy economy. While the SAF
prioritises economic growth, it also recognises
the need for strong social welfare policies to
support the most “vulnerable” individuals.
2.1 Key policy areas
The evidence presented in this report has
particular significance for two key policy
areas within the SAF. The first policy area
relates to the development of agriculture,
while the second area is concerned with
livelihoods and social protection. The
remainder of this chapter summarises the
central arguments from these two policy
areas and identifies critical issues with which
this report will engage. The summaries
presented here are from the Natural Resources
(NR) Technical Annex and the Livelihoods and
Social Protection (LSP) Technical Annex of
the SAF.
2.1.1 Agriculture/NR Technical Annex
Agriculture is addressed under the NR
Technical Annex, which has the overall
objective of “improved livelihoods and
economic conditions of rural families and
enhanced household food security.”8 This is
based on the assumption, stated at the very
outset of the annex that “Over 80 percent
of the population is dependent on
agriculture.”9 The targets set to measure
performance in achieving the objective, which
are identified in the executive summary,
include reduction in ministry of agriculture
staff, the establishment of river basin
management agencies, the extent of irrigation
8 Government of Afghanistan/International Agencies. Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Accomplishments and Strategic Path
Forward, Natural Resources Technical Annex. Kabul: Government of Afghanistan/International Agencies. January 2004,
Executive Summary, i.
9 Ibid.
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orchard areas, and productivity improvements
for wheat and livestock.
The annex is structured around a review of
the status of key sub-sectors (agriculture and
livestock, land issues, etc.), progress in the
nine sub-programmes of the sub-sectors, and
current organisational arrangements. The
annex then goes on to identify its vision,
goals and objectives, which have already
been mentioned above. Key strategic areas
in relation to sectoral activities are identified,
including inter-alia “improving the economic
well-being of rural households and
communities through broad-based and
equitable agricultural reconstruction.”10 The
annex then identifies areas of policy and
institutional reform before going on to
describe in detail by sub-sector the key issues,
strategic objectives, needs assessment and
policy agenda. The annex concludes with a
detailed development programme and budget.
This is not the place for a detailed analysis
of the arguments within the technical annex.
However, given the evident origins of this
annex in the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB)
Natural Resources and Agricultural Needs
Assessment, prepared in 2002, it is pertinent
to refer to the arguments of a critique of this
assessment. Although the overall goal for
agriculture in the ADB’s needs assessment is
to improve rural livelihoods, it is simply
assumed that livelihoods are largely
constructed out of agriculture. Moreover,
detailed sub-sectoral objectives and outputs
are not connected with the livelihood goal,
but are instead focused entirely on sub-
sectoral concerns.11
Likewise, with the NR Annex it remains
unclear what the statement “Over 80% of the
population is dependent on the agricultural
and natural resource management sector”12
actually means, or where this claim comes
from. While no doubt a useful (but
problematic) simplification for policy
purposes, the statement is at best ambiguous.
Does the statement refer to 80 percent of
all the population of Afghanistan or just the
rural population? What does dependent mean?
Is it a direct or indirect dependence? Is it a
total or partial dependence? Is it uniform or
differentiated by location, class or gender?
There are, moreover, some key issues that
arise with respect to the actual role of
agriculture in the livelihoods of rural people:
How many of the rural population are directly
and fully dependent on agricultural production
for their livelihoods and where are these
various populations? How many are partially
dependent on production and derive income
sources from elsewhere and who are they?
How many are indirectly engaged in
agriculture, primarily through labour in
agriculture and agriculturally related
activities? How many rural households actually
derive the majority of their income from
non-agricultural sources? These are critical
issues that will determine how the direct and
indirect benefits of agricultural growth are
actually distributed. These points will be
returned to in the concluding chapter of this
report, as the implications of the data from
this project are considered in relation to
policy and programming options.
2.1.2 LSP Technical Annex
The LSP Public Investment Programme
(LSP/PIP), which is part of the Human and
Social Capital Pillar of the NDF, includes the
most comprehensive treatment of the linkages
between poverty reduction and growth. The
LSP/PIP is designed to promote a strategic
shift beyond humanitarian approaches to
relief and to encourage the provision of long-
term support to the poor, which should better
enable them to protect their assets and
rebuild their livelihoods. Underlying the
10 Ibid. Paragraph 60.
11 Pain and Lautze, op cit.
12 Government of Afghanistan/International Agencies, Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Accomplishments and Strategic Path
Forward, Natural Resources Technical Annex, op cit. Paragraph 2.
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and assessment systems to enhance
understanding of livelihood systems, existing
informal safety-net mechanisms and
vulnerability to various risks.
The LSP Technical Annex starts with an
analysis of current knowledge of poverty,
vulnerability and risk in Afghanistan. It draws
attention to the diversity of livelihood
strategies at inter- and intra-household levels,
and raises questions about assumptions linking
agricultural growth and poverty reduction.
It in fact draws from some of the early outputs
from this project.13 It details existing
programmes operating under the overall pillar
goal of “putting in place an effective and
affordable social policy which enhances
human security and supports sustainable rural
and urban livelihoods.”14 These programmes
include the National Emergency Employment
Programme (NEEP), the National Solidarity
Programme (NSP), the National Risk and
Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA), the National
Area Based Development Programme (NABDP)
and the Micro-Finance Support Facility in
Afghanistan (MISFA).
In section two of the annex, constraints and
cross-cutting issues are identified. These
include institutional constraints, a recognition
“that formal and market based options are
limited for risk management in the immediate
future,”15 and a need for information,
monitoring and evaluation in order to build
“understanding of informal and community-
based solidarity systems and social networks
for risk management.”16 Section three sets
out the goals and key priorities of LSP, and
focuses on the link between social protection
and the promotion of sustainable livelihoods.17
This includes recognition of the different
strategies (prevention, mitigation and coping)
needed to handle diverse risks and the range
of approaches that exist to manage risk
(informal, market-based and public).18 A set
of key priorities and programme areas are
identified, each linked to targets with
appropriate indicators to key goals, including
poverty reduction and promotion of gender
equality. The final two sections of the annex
address costing and delivery targets and
implementation strategies.
The evidence presented in this report raises
a number of critical issues for the two policy
areas summarised above, particularly
concerning assumptions linking livelihoods
and agriculture. Other key issues include
assumptions about gender roles, the livelihood
strategies of the poor, risk and vulnerability.
These issues will be discussed in more detail
in the concluding chapter.
13 Kerr-Wilson and Pain, op cit.
14 Government of Afghanistan/International Agencies. Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Accomplishments and Strategic Path
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This chapter outlines the five stages of the
Rural Livelihoods Monitoring Research Project,
from design to analysis, as well as highlights
the limitations of the methods used.
3.1 Project stages
Stage 1: Design interview formats
Two interview formats were designed to
gather information on human, financial,
physical, natural and social assets in order
to obtain a better understanding of how
different people in rural areas are building
their livelihoods. The first format was a village
description that aimed to gather data on
village location, characteristics, distances to
services, land holdings, activities, wealth
groupings, cooperation and conflicts.
The second format was an extensive
questionnaire, which consisted of 12 tables
looking at household composition, household
member skills, education, activities,
household history, household assets, land
assets, livestock, debts, grain budget, income
and expenditure (see Appendix 3).
In the first round of interviews, questions
were asked about the previous four seasons.
The questionnaire was designed to be asked
to the same households over time at an
intended interval of four months. During
subsequent rounds of interviews, questions
referred to the previous four months. Five
NGOs were able to complete two rounds of
interviews and one NGO was able to complete
three rounds of interviews in two locations.
The first set of data was collected between
November 2002 and July 2003, as each NGO
started the interviews at different times.
The second and third rounds of interviews
were carried out between February 2003 and
December 2003.
A cohort tracking system was used, which
was designed to allow an understanding of
change over time, if the research is continued.
This tracking method was employed to allow
the research team to check the information
collected for consistency. It was also hoped
that it would enable interviewers to build up
some trust with the interviewees.
Stage 2: Partnership formation and staff
selection
This study involved collaboration with seven
partner NGOs who conducted the research
in the seven provinces (DACAAR conducted
the research in both Laghman and Herat
Provinces and CHA worked together with
EOCA) and analysed their own findings.
Partnerships were formed based on the
interest of individual NGOs and depending
on where they worked, as an attempt was
made to look at sites in different parts of
the country (see Table 1).
Each NGO was responsible for selecting staff
from their own organisation to conduct the
research. Some partner NGOs had to hire
staff for the project, as they lacked available
staff. Each research team consisted of at
least one male and one female who were
trained either in Kabul or in the field on the
purpose of the project, the use of the
interview formats, and the ethics of research.
At least one person in each NGO was also
assigned the task of data entry and data
cleaning and provided training by AREU.
Stage 3: Site and household selection
Each NGO decided which areas would be the
most valuable for them to look at within
districts where they work. Within these areas
village selection was then undertaken based
on the following criteria:
• Whether the NGO had been working in
the village and had some relationship
with the villagers;
• Whether the NGO wished to continue
working in those areas; and
• Whether there were differences between
the villages such as location along a
valley, proximity to services or livelihood
source.
The main characteristics of the villages
selected are summarised in Table 1. 
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V1 Jurm Valley and
mountain with
mixed economy
Valley at 1,907 m Spread of opium
economy
AKDN: Badakhshan
V2 Valley at 1,659 m Spread of opium
economy
V2 Mt at 2,334 m Largely rain-fed
land
CHA/EOCA: Faryab











V3 Upstream - 200 m Carpet weaving
V1 Jaghatu Narrow valley with
karez irrigation
dgought affected
Upper Valley Strong remittance
income
V2 Mid Valley Little remittance
income






































V2 Mt slope at
1,200 m
Land ownership
V3 Mt at 1,450 m Land ownership
Valley at 1,000 m
CARE: Ghazni
GAA: Saripul













Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 11
Rethinking Rural Livelihoods in AfghanistanAt the start of the first round of interviews,
the interviewers met village shuras (councils)
in each village to explain the project and its
aims as well as to explain that there would
be no direct benefit from participating in the
research. Meetings were then arranged to
collect information for the village
descriptions. The village description questions
were asked to male shuras and, where
possible, some of the questions were also
asked to groups of women.
A wealth ranking exercise was also conducted
in each village. For the purposes of
comparison across areas, the research teams
explained the meaning of household, which
is defined in this project as the smallest unit
living inside a compound and usually consisted
of husband, wife and dependent children.
With this definition in mind, members of the
community – usually male shura members –
were first asked to explain the characteristics
of a poor and wealthy household in their
village. They were then asked how many
different wealth groups there were in their
village and subsequently to list the names of
households falling into each category.
Households for individual interviews were
then randomly selected from the lists of
households generated from the wealth ranking
exercise. The number of households in each
grouping determined the number of
households selected from each wealth group.
The more households there were in the
poorest wealth group, the greater the number
of households from this group was sampled.
Between 15 and 20 households were
interviewed in each village, resulting in a
total sample of 390 households (see
Table 2).
Stage 4: Implementation
Individual NGOs began the interviews at
different times depending on when they
joined the project, and also due to delays
resulting from insecurity or difficulties
recruiting appropriate staff.
Male and female team members went to the
same household at the same time. The male
interviewer interviewed the household head
if the household was male-headed and the
oldest male available if it was female-headed.
The female interviewer interviewed the
household head if the household was female-
headed and a senior woman if the household
was male-headed.
Special studies
In addition to the above interviews, three
special studies were conducted as part of
the Rural Livelihoods Monitoring Research
Project. The aim of these studies was to
deepen understanding of aspects of the
livelihoods data not adequately captured in
the formats described above. These three
interlinked studies were conducted with three
NGOs: CHA/EOCA in Daulatabad, Faryab
Province and GAA in Saripul Province.
CHA/EOCA also took part in the design of the
studies. These studies looked at three themes
in a total of five villages: (i) the impact of
wheat seed interventions, (ii) gender roles
in agriculture, and (iii) water management
as a village institution.19
Stage 5: Data entry and data analysis
After each round of interviews, or during the
interview rounds, data were entered into
databases managed by individual NGOs. AREU
gave each partner NGO a replica of a database
that was designed by AREU and the
Afghanistan Information Management Service
(AIMS). The database was built by AIMS.
Partner NGOs then cleaned the data and sent
it to AREU for generating reports.
Unfortunately, creating reporting structures
in Access proved problematic and
programming problems in the reports led to
inaccurate data outputs. As a consequence
of these difficulties, partner NGOs had to
run many of their own queries to produce
data for analysis, which was very time
consuming.
19 To obtain copies of the special studies reports see AREU’s website: www.areu.org.af.
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of interviews, the first of two analysis
workshops was held. In the first workshop
the basic stages of analysis were outlined
and participants worked through a number
of key questions designed to help them
interrogate data and look for differences and
similarities between wealth groups, villages
and sites. Other activities included examining
Key: WGI, II, III, IV respectively wealth groups I, II, III and IV.
what the data meant and what implications
it had for programming. The first workshop
also involved discussions on the types of data
that may need follow-up research. 
Following the field interviews, each NGO was
to ask some of the “why” questions not
captured in the questionnaire, for example,
why people are doing particular activities at
certain times of the year, why they are not
Table : Sample frame
Province/Village WGI WGII WGIII WGIV Total No. of households
Badakhshan
V1 2 6 12 20
V2 3 4 13 20
V3 0 4 8 8 20
60
Faryab
V1 5 7 8 20
V2 5 5 10 20
V3 5 8 7 20
60
Ghazni
V1 2 11 7 20
V2 1 2 6 11 20
V3 7 5 8 20
60
Herat
V1 2 3 8 2 15
V2 3 3 7 2 15
V3 2 2 9 2 15
45
Kandahar
V1 2 7 11 20
V2 1 5 14 20
V3 2 18 20
60
Laghman
V1 4 5 6 15
V2 2 3 10 15
V3 1 13 1 15
45
Saripul
V1 3 7 10 20
V2 3 5 5 6 19
V3 3 10 8 21
60
Total 58 133 168 31 390
Percent 15% 34% 43% 8%
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labour. However, due to resource constraints,
only one NGO was able to ask the “why”
questions. For this NGO the follow up proved
very fruitful in terms of gaining a better
understanding of the livelihoods of the people
in the villages surveyed. Some of the other
partner NGOs, which were not able to ask
the “why” questions, did follow up with their
field staff to discuss the meaning of the data
collected. This enabled them to use the often-
untapped knowledge of field staff to fill in
some of the gaps in the data collected in the
interviews.
The second workshop was held to review the
analysis conducted by the NGOs and focused
on how to identify differences between each
round of data. A checklist of key questions
was again designed to facilitate this analysis.
The comparative analysis of the across site
data for this report was carried out by AREU
and used data from queries to examine
differences and similarities across sites, as




In the vast majority of cases wealthier
households were said to be those with larger
land holdings and occasionally businesses,
while the poorest households were identified
as those who rely on daily labour and
sometimes begging. The categorisation was
mostly the same in all villages, but there
were some differences. For example,
receiving remittance income is seen to denote
wealth in the villages in Ghazni Province.
This is in a context where the three villages
have very small land holdings and lack water
resources, which has resulted in very little,
if any, production for most households.
One other difference was that although larger
land holdings were seen as synonymous with
being wealthy, the size of land holdings varied
enormously from location to location. In
villages in Faryab Province, for example, 15
to 70 jeribs of irrigated land and 50 to 100
jeribs of rain-fed land denote wealth,
compared to villages in Herat Province where
10-20 jeribs of land in total denotes wealth.
Differences in the quality of land, etc., must
also be taken into account. Thus comparing
poor wealth groups across sites is not
comparing like with like, although these
groups do often share similar characteristics
in terms of asset ownership and income
sources.
Wealth ranking exercises can cause conflict
in villages when people become angry at not
being placed in the poorest categories, due
to expectations of assistance, despite
repeated explanations that no direct benefits
of participation are available. Despite the
problems already noted, for the purposes of
this research wealth groupings proved very
useful and mostly consistent in terms of
identifying characteristics of richer and poorer
households in diverse areas.
Unit of analysis
The “household” was the unit of analysis for
this study and was defined as the smallest
unit living inside a compound. The household
unit usually comprised a husband, wife and
dependent children. For the village
description in each village, groups of people,
usually male shura members, were asked
what the terms “family” and “household”
locally mean. In some areas the term “family”
was the smallest unit, while in others it
referred to the extended family. The
researchers endeavoured to ensure that the
locally correct term for the smallest unit was
used in all villages. It was not possible to
interview all members of a compound, as
this often totalled around 40 people. As a
result, this report does not capture
relationships or the pooling of assets, labour
and/or income between units within individual
compounds.
Capturing change over time
A longer period of time is needed to capture
change over time for many aspects of the
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change over time in household grain budgets,
land assets, income and expenditure cannot
be explored at this stage. For grain budgets,
the seasonal variation in household grain
inflows, due to higher grain inflows at harvest
time, for example, means that to compare
a year’s data with another four months can
skew the results, if the second round of data
is collected either post or pre-harvest. Also,
each NGO did not begin at the same time
and therefore conducted interviews at
different seasons to one another. To be able
to compare these changes over time another
full year’s worth of data is needed. The same
limitations affect the data on income and
expenditure. For the land data, changes were
not adequately captured, although it is
unlikely that there were many major changes
during the research period.
Using categories
Many of the questions asked on the
questionnaire were closed to enable easier
coding of answers for data entry. Two
problems were encountered with this.  The
first was that many answers fell into the
category of “other” and to produce these
data from the database was very time
consuming. In terms of the categories
themselves, several were too broad, which
means it was not possible to identify what
makes up these categories. For example, it
is unclear what the category non-farm labour
entailed in all cases.
Size of questionnaire
The household questionnaire was very
extensive and took a lot of time to complete.
Some households reportedly became bored,
which may have affected the answers given.
Aside from the problem of the length of the
interviews from the perspective of the
household, it was also very time consuming
for the NGOs. The NGO partners intending
to continue this type of monitoring have
therefore decided to do so in a modified
form. Starting with an extensive questionnaire
has, however, allowed partner NGOs to see
which questions work best and are the most
useful.
Content of questionnaire
Collecting information on particular assets
such as savings and jewellery proved very
difficult as people, understandably, do not
wish to divulge this kind of information. This
means that aspects of the data relating to
assets cannot be relied upon and have
therefore not been included in the analysis
for this report.
Furthermore, the questionnaire formats were
not able to capture the relational aspects of
household lives both within households and
between households (indeed it is one of the
weaknesses of the sustainable livelihoods
framework). To understand the pathways or
trajectories of change for households in one
wealth group requires an understanding of
changes in households of other socio-economic
groups. Thus the livelihoods of poor people
are related to the livelihoods of others, as
poor households are often dependent on
those who are better off. Poverty does not
occur outside a context and has to be
understood in structural terms.
Equally, this project does not link livelihoods
at the micro household level with the meso
village and district level nor to wider dynamics
that permeate Afghanistan and shape the
conditions under which most people live.
While the study refers to government policies
and programmes, the reality is that the
central government and reconstruction effort
are not the key drivers of change affecting
people’s lives. The experience of most people
has far more to do with the impact of
uncertainty, risk and poverty. Conflict,
commodity and labour markets, power
structures, informal institutions and non-
state spaces are what exist and are the key
sources of risk in daily life. These factors are
also critical for explaining the resilience of
Afghan livelihoods. It is, therefore, important
to remember that projects and villages are
not development islands.
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The database used for storing the data
collected by partner NGOs was designed by
AREU and built by AIMS using the Access
programme. Unfortunately, many problems
were encountered producing reports from
the database and were incorrect.  As a result,
partner NGOs had to manually run database
queries on the data, which was very time
consuming.
Sample size
Due to the small sample size (390 households),
the extent to which the findings are
statistically valid for the rest of the country
is limited. However, where there are
similarities across sites, it is still possible to
infer that similar trends may be occurring in
other parts of the country.  It is also possible
in some cases to compare findings obtained
in this study to those in other studies
conducted in other parts of the country.
NGO resources
This study was resource heavy in terms of
staff time needed and some NGOs were more
able to free up resources than others. As has
already been mentioned, this meant for most
of the partners that follow-up research was
not possible.
Security
Insecurity presented huge challenges at
various stages of the research.  Interviews
had to be delayed in three locations and one
research site had to be moved to another
area. However, due to the flexibility and
commitment of those NGO staff members
involved, all NGOs managed to complete at
least two rounds of interviews.
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interlinked aspects of rural livelihoods from
the villages studied.  It first examines where
different households obtain their grain, before
looking at how different households access
land. Evidence relating to household livestock
holdings, income sources, expenditure and
debts are then discussed. Change over time
is looked at in the sections on household debt
and livestock holdings.
4.1 Household grain budgets20
Given the persistence of the argument “80
percent of the population is dependent on
agriculture,” understanding grain budgets is
critical. The starting questions here are
straightforward – Where do households obtain
grain? What proportion of grain comes from
4. Key Rural Livelihoods Findings
production? What proportion comes from the
market or other exchange mechanisms (gifts,
labour paid in grain, gleaning, begging, etc.)?
The analysis presented here only looks at
wheat budgets, thus excluding other grains,
in particular rice and maize, although of the
research sites rice and maize production only
occurs in Laghman and Herat Provinces. The
information collected on four seasons in the
first round of interviews has been aggregated
and the data discussed here therefore
represent a full year. These data are presented
in Table 3, which categorises sites, villages
and wealth groups in terms of the relative
proportions of wheat coming from farm
production (the vertical or Y axis) and the
proportion coming from the market (the
horizontal or X axis).
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Percent of grain supply from farm production
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Percent of wheat supply obtained from the market
From Table 3 a number of summary
observations can be made. First, there are
households that obtain a majority of their
wheat from farm production. Of the 12 wealth
groups in this category (inner box 1 of Table
3), nine are from wealth group one (WGI)
and three are from wealth group two (WGII).
Together they comprise 11 percent of sample
households. Key sites within this box are
Herat, Faryab, and Saripul with more than
one wealth group each, and Badakhshan and
Kandahar with only one wealth group.
At the opposite end of the spectrum are
households that obtain almost all of their
grain supply from the market. There are 19
wealth groups in total in this category, mostly
from Laghman, Ghazni, Kandahar and Saripul.
Nine of these are from wealth group III (WGIII)
or below, six are from WGII, and four from
WGI, and together these make up 31.6 percent
of sample households. It must be noted that
three of the WGI groups are from Ghazni,
where in two of the three villages WGI was
described as poor, with WGII and WGIII being
poorer and poorest. In the third village, WGI
was described as “middle income” rather
than wealthy. Thus no households were
considered wealthy in the three villages in
Ghazni. Households from all wealth groups
in two of the villages in Ghazni also received
a small amount of their grain budget from
food for work programmes, both in the first
and second round of interviews.
Groups occupying intermediate positions are
obtaining grain supplies from both production
and the market, with the richer wealth groups
tending to obtain a majority (50-75 percent)
from farm production (14 percent of sample
households) and poorer wealth groups
obtaining 25-50 percent of their grain from
farm production (18.5 percent of sample
households).
There are also groups that obtain grain from
production, market and non-market exchange
and for whom food for work may be an
important contribution, although this also
includes credit (and debt), rights of gleaning,
gifts and begging. These comprise 24.9
percent of sample households.
Key: BD = Badakhshan; FA = Faryab; GH = Ghazni; HR = Herat; KD = Kandahar; LG = Laghman; SA = Saripul; V1, V2, V3
respectively Village 1, Village 2 and Village 3; WGI, II, III, IV respectively Wealth Groups I, II, III and IV; N=Number of Households.
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their household grain budget. These
households are in Badakhshan, Herat and
Kandahar. All of these households are from
the poorest wealth groups and the amounts
of grain they receive from begging ranges
from 10 to 300 seers. Widows head six of the
20 households and it is for these households
that begging is the major means of accessing
grain. What is striking about six of the
remaining households is that they contain
men of around 70 years of age, married to
women at least 15 years younger. In some
cases, the reason for this age gap is partly
explained by a first wife dying and the
husband remarrying a younger woman. In
several cases the men are too weak to work
and begging provides the extra grain needed
to supplement the labour of the wife and
children (see Box 1). It is difficult to see how
the future will be brighter for some of these
households. Given such an age gap between
husband and wife, with all things being equal,
these women will be widowed before too
long, and as will be discussed later, women
in Afghanistan have fewer opportunities for
generating sufficient income than men. Initial
findings from the NRVA data indicate that
female–headed households have poverty rates
of more than 70 percent compared to those
of male-headed households, which are closer
to the overall rural poverty rate of 53
percent.21
The remaining households who beg for grain
have very few assets. Five households in
Badakhshan sold or mortgaged land during
the drought; one household also sold their
house due to “family problems” and another
household sold trees. A few households receive
very small amounts of grain from their own
production, but it appears that this is not
enough to last even one season. Several of
the households receive grain from a variety
of means: buying, borrowing, being paid in-
kind, and gathering from people’s fields as
well as begging.
That these households are able to obtain all
or part of their grain from begging does show
that some form of social support mechanisms
are in place. The majority of households in
the higher wealth groups, who receive some
of their grain from their own production, did
also report giving some of it away. What this
appears to show is that the more grain a
household has the more it will give away,
thus possibly supporting the chronically poor,
who are little able to help themselves.  There
is, however, a need for further research into
the giving of alms and the practice of begging,
as not enough is known about these issues.
As well as wealth group differences in grain
budgets there are clearly site differences
(and differences within sites), reflecting
water and land resources. Table 4 summarises
by site the percent of grain obtained from
production by percent of sample households.
21 MRRD and World Bank. Rural Poverty in Afghanistan: Initial Insights from NRVA. Kabul: MRDD. 2004
Box 1: Begging for grain
One woman in Herat said she had been married at the age of 7 to a man of 50.  She said she has
“faced a lot of tragedy” in her life. She is now around 37 and her husband around 90.  He had
become ill many years before and was unable to work.  In the past she had woven carpets and
embroidered but her eyesight had become so weak that she could no longer engage in these
activities. This household owns no land, but owns one cow and four chickens. With three of her
four children (three girls and one boy) under 12 the household income now comes from what her
husband can beg, together with her payment for cleaning a neighbour’s house and baking bread
for others.
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1. In Faryab and Herat, 45 percent or more
of sample households obtain more than
50 percent of their grain from farm
production.
2. In Ghazni, Kandahar and Laghman the
majority of households (more than 75
percent) obtain less than 25 percent of
their grain from farm production.
3. There is an intermediate group in
Badakhshan and Saripul where there is
a more even distribution of sample
households across the groupings.
The question that arises from this grain budget
evidence is to what extent the site differences
reflect rainfall conditions or a combination
of drought and land ownership patterns.
4.2 Land ownership patterns
Before commenting on the land ownership
findings, a key point needs to be made in
respect to the description of land as an asset.
The livelihood framework in general tends
to treat all assets in the language of economics
and to address them as if they are the same
as financial assets. This aspect of the
livelihood framework has been criticised,
Table 4: Percent of grain obtained from farm production by site
% wheat from BD FA GH HR KH LG SA All Sites
farm production
>75% 3.4 30.0 0 22.2 3.3 0 18.3 11.1
50 – 75% 28.8 28.3 0 22.2 3.3 11.1 5.0 13.9
25 – 49% 27.1 13.3 0 55.6 0 17.6 28.3 18.5
< 25% 40.7 28.3 100 0 93.3 75.6 48.3 56.6
Total 60 60 60 45 60 45 60 390
particularly regarding land, as it “wrenches
land out if its relational aspects.”22 As has
already been mentioned in the methods
chapter, the livelihoods of poor people are
related to and can depend on those who are
better off. Thus understanding access to land
(and other assets), and the way in which
people are entitled to or excluded from
accessing land, is intrinsic to understanding
land relations.
Ownership and access to land is a complicated
issue that requires careful analysis, as Liz
Alden Wily has noted.23 The field evidence
from the research sites reveals at least seven
major categories of access to and use of land,
as listed below:
• Households can own and cultivate their
land;
• Households can own land, cultivate and
sharecrop-in additional land;
• Households can own land and sharecrop-
out land, either a portion or all;
• Households with no land may sharecrop-
in land for cultivation;
• Households without land may work as
farm labour during part of the year in
exchange for a small part of the crop or
wages;24
22 Whitehead, A. “Tracking Livelihood Change: Theoretical, Methodological and Empirical Perspective from North-East Ghana.”
Journal of Southern African Studies. 2002. 28 (3).
23 Liz Alden Wily refers to one major survey of livestock, feed and rangelands which did not even touch on the contestation
over pasture rights; another study on crop and food supply assessment appeared to assume that farmers own both the land
and the product. See Alden Wily, L. Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistan. Kabul: AREU. 2003.
24 In three villages in Daulatabad, Faryab, for example, both men and older women reported working on the melon crop for
three months in exchange for 1/7 of the crop. See Grace, J. Gender Roles in Agriculture: Case Studies from Five Villages
in Northern Afghanistan. Kabul: AREU. 2004.
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cultivate any land; and
• Households with or without land, but
who own livestock, can access pasture
land for grazing animals in areas where
there is accessible pasture land.
There are a number of further points regarding
land ownership that need to be made. First,
sharecropping-in is not restricted to the lower
wealth groups, but occurs across all wealth
groups. Second, sharecropping-out is not
restricted to just the wealthier groups, but
also occurs across all wealth groups. This is
not to say that the motivations for
sharecropping-in or out are the same across
wealth groups or even within them. Indeed,
evidence from Laghman indicates a tendency
for larger landholders to sharecrop-out for
reasons of both status and to pursue
alternatives that are more profitable
(essentially pull factors). Poorer households,
however, sharecrop-out because of push
factors (limited labour or other resource
constraints, such as lack of draught power
for cultivation). One man interviewed in
Saripul Province, for example, was
sharecropping-out land due to a lack of
draught power and then sharecropping-in
land from a landowner with draught power.
For female-headed households who own land,
but lack household labour resources, the
need to sharecrop-out may be due to not
wanting to cultivate the land themselves,
not having the experience to do so, not having
time to cultivate the land, or it not being
culturally acceptable.
Table 5 below summarises the various
arrangements that can take place with respect
to access to land for two of the sites with
the most land-based economies.
Table 5: Patterns of cultivation (percentage of households by wealth group)
Provinces/ Owning/ Owning/ Owning/ Not Owning/ Not Owning/
Villages Cultivating Sharecropping Sharecropping Sharecropping or Cultivating
Land -in land –out land -in land
Badakhshan
V1-WG1 100 0 50 0 0
V1-WGII 100 33 33 0 0
V1-WGIII 91 9 18 0 9
V2-WGI 100 33 66 0 0
V2-WGII 100 100 0 0 0
V2-WGIII 25 25 0 58 17
V3-WGI 100 100 0 0 0
V3-WGII 100 50 12.5 0 0
V3-WGIII 75 25 12.5 25 0
Faryab
V1-WG1 100 0 60 0 0
V1-WGII 100 0 100 0 0
V1-WGIII 82 18 45 0 18
V2-WGI 100 0 10 0 0
V2-WGII 100 0 80 0 0
V2-WGIII 29 29 0 14 57
V3-WGI 100 20 80 0 0
V3-WGII 100 50 38 0 0
V3-WGIII 14 14 0 14 72
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are driven by context and circumstances. In
Badakhshan, sharecropping arrangements
have to be understood in terms of the opium
poppy economy. Several factors create
incentives both for larger landowners to
sharecrop-out and for smaller landowners
and the landless to sharecrop-in. These factors
include a high requirement for labour in
poppy cultivation (350 person days per hectare
compared to 41 for wheat),25 the role of
opium poppy in providing credit, and the
potential for profit. In contrast, in Saripul
and Faryab Provinces, where a wheat economy
dominates the irrigated and rain-fed lands,
the current pull of non-farm opportunities,
due to relatively well paid urban construction
labour, has potentially reduced the available
pool of rural labour that are motivated to
sharecrop-in.26
The terms under which sharecropping
arrangements are made cannot be assumed.
The source of inputs (labour, land, draught
power and other inputs) influences the
sharecropping arrangements, as do other
factors. These include the availability and
price of farm labour, the crop to be cultivated,
whether the land is rain-fed or irrigated, and
the relations between the sharecropper and
the landlord. The economic status of the
sharecropper may also affect the agreements.
The poorest sharecroppers, in Saripul and
Faryab, receive some of their share of the
crop in advance, as they cannot wait until
after harvest. They then receive a smaller
share after the harvest. Similarly, some live
in the landlord’s house, receiving food and
sometimes clothing, but a smaller share of
the crop at harvest time. The extent to which
exploitation is bound up in these relationships
was not explored, but other studies suggest
these relationships can be very exploitative.27
Cross-site comparison of land ownership and
cultivation, more generally, highlights the
following:
• In Faryab, Kandahar and Saripul Provinces
at least 2 of the 3 villages from each site
have marked differences in the percent
of households in WGI and WGII owning
and cultivating land compared to those
in WGIII (a difference of more than 50
percentage points in at least two
villages).
• In these same three sites, nearly 50
percent or more (Faryab 48 percent,
Kandahar 90 percent and Saripul 76
percent) of WGIII or above households
do not own land nor are they cultivating
land. For Kandahar, however, it must be
mentioned that before the drought many
households rented-in and sharecropped
land.
• Owning and sharecropping-in land is most
common in Badakhshan, Herat and
Faryab, although for different reasons.
In Badakhshan, for example, this is
undoubtedly due to the high labour
demands of opium poppy, which
encourages landowners to sharecrop-out
land, while the potential income from
opium poppy encourages those with
limited or no land to sharecrop-in land.
• Owning land and sharecropping-out is a
particular feature of Badakhshan and
Faryab Provinces, although again probably
for different reasons.
• Not owning land but sharecropping-in is
essentially restricted to members of
WGIII and occurs across all sites. However,
only a relatively small proportion of these
households are in this position, except
in Badakhshan, where it is more
significant (again probably due to poppy
production).
25 Mansfield, D. “The Economic Superiority of Illicit Drug Production: Myth and Reality,” Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan,
Paper Prepared for the International Conference on Alternative Development in Drug Control and Cooperation, Feldafing,
September, 2001.
26 Coke, A. Wheat Seed and Agriculture Programming in Afghanistan: It Potential to Impact on Livelihoods: Two Case Studies
from Five Villages in Two Provinces. Kabul: AREU. 2004.
27 See Alden Wily, Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistan, op cit; Christoplos, I. Out of Step? Agricultural
Policy and Afghan Livelihoods. Kabul: AREU. 2004.
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ownership and access, helps us understand
these cross-site patterns.  Table 6 lists by
site, village and wealth group the average
area of land in jeribs (one jerib equals 2000
square metres) held by each wealth group.
Statistics showing the dispersion of values
around the average are not shown for reasons
of clarity of presentation, but they are wide
and standard deviations of the mean are also
generally large. This reflects the size
differences in land holdings that occur within
the same wealth group.
For the purposes of analysis, land types
(irrigated, rain-fed, orchard, etc.) in Table
6 are combined and not analysed by type. It
is important to note, however, that the land
data from Faryab includes major holdings of
rain-fed land, although most villages also
own irrigated land. The data for Saripul also
include significant areas of rain-fed land,
with only a few households also owning
irrigated land. In all other sites, rain-fed land
was insignificant.
It is also important to note that these land
data are based on what was reported and
not measured. The unit of the “jerib,”
whether it is the Kabuli (official government)
version or not, is more realistically a variable
rather than an absolute measure of land area.
Thus, the points of comparison are not
comparing like with like in terms of land
quality, irrigated versus rain-fed land, and
so forth.
Table 6: Land ownership: mean area (jeribs) by wealth group, WGIII as percent of total sample
area and mean household area per village
Provinces/Villages WGI WGII WGIII WGIII as % total land Village Mean
Badakhshan
V1 16.3 43.5 1.9 7.2    (60) 16
V2 33.7 6.8 0.4 3.1    (63) 7.3
V3 8.9 4.3 2.6 22.7  (80) 4.5
Faryab
V1 1,932 930 241 13.8  (40) 959
V2 132 50 0.3 0.2    (50) 45.6
V3 216 51 11 5.0    (35) 78.6
Ghazni
V1 * * * *
V2 * * * *
V3 1.4 3.8 1.4 33.7  (40) 1.7
Herat
V1 0.3 5 1.9 54.4  (67) 2.3
V2 18 5 9.5 48.8  (60) 8.3
V3 4.5 3 1.2 25.0  (73) 1.9
Kandahar
V1 24.2 5.7 0 0      (55) 8.1
V2 80 30.4 4.1 20    (74) 14.5
V3 400 0 0      (90) 40
Laghman
V1 3.4 1.8 1.0 21    (40) 1.9
V2 5.3 1.8 1.4 47    (67) 2
V3 0.8 1.1 0.5 3.2    (7) 1.0
Saripul
V1 62 20.5 4.5 12     (50) 18.6
V2 0.3 25 3.5 12.2  (58) 7.5
V3 56.3 23.4 5.9 1.0    (38) 22.5
* Unavailable data
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below (WGIII and IV have been combined)
are expressed as a percent of the total land
area of sample households. The number of
households in these wealth groups (as a
percent of the total sample) is expressed in
the brackets. The final column (column 5)
states the mean area of the total village
sample. 
Looking at the data across all villages and
sites, the proportion of land held by WGIII
households is usually substantially less than
their weight in the village household sample.
For four sites (Badakhshan, Herat, Kandahar
and Saripul) the households in WGIII are a
majority of sample households (50 percent
or more), but own a minority of land. In
comparison, the mean land area of WGI
households is substantially greater than that
of WGII, although not always (contrast Faryab
and Kandahar with Ghazni [V3], Badakhshan
[V1] and Saripul [V2]).
There are of course exceptions: attention is
drawn particularly to Laghman, Herat and
Ghazni, where there is more equitable land
distribution (which is not to say that they
are equitable). This finding for Laghman and
Ghazni reflects the small land areas and
mountainous geography of the holdings.
However, the data for Herat require further
investigation. This is particularly so as
comparative evidence indicates that the
greatest inequalities in land holdings tend to
occur in the most intensive areas of
cultivation, which are generally intensively
irrigated areas such as Herat. It must be
noted that follow-up interviews in Herat by
DACAAR staff found that in village two, 300
jeribs of land (compared to a village average
of one to four jeribs per household) is owned
by a man living in Herat City. The owner had
purchased the land, rather than inheriting
it, and now sharecrops most of it out.28
Gender inequalities of landownership also
exist across most sites, although the patterns
of ownership differ both within villages and
between sites. Table 7 shows the percentage
of men from landed households who consider
land to be owned jointly by men and women.
Of the total households who own land, 31
percent said both men and women own the
land. This figure is skewed by the fact that
all households in Laghman and Herat reported
that land is owned jointly. However, follow-
up interviews by DACAAR staff in Laghman
and Herat found that women are not
considered able to exercise any decision
making power over the land.29 Moreover,
when women inherit land they are mostly
expected to pass the land onto their
brothers.30
In terms of women owning land by themselves,
only 1.87 percent of women from the sample
own land in their own name, and these are
mostly from Badakhshan. Of particular note
is that four women in two of the Badakhshan
villages own land by themselves, despite
being in male-headed households. It would
be interesting to find out how these women
are able to retain ownership in their own
right and what this ownership means for
them. Of the 25 female-headed households
in the sample, only one woman owns land
(though this may be because the remaining
women are from landless families).
Anecdotal evidence suggests that women may
sometimes have to sell their land if they are
not able to cultivate it. Women who own
land and retain it will often sharecrop it out,
though this will depend on availability of
household labour. This is an areas that
warrants much further exploration to see if
there are ways of supporting women who
own or access land or who can make claims
on land to be able to use the land as
productively as possible.
28 Kerr-Wilson, A., and Ghafori, J. Monitoring Afghan Rural Livelihoods: Six Villages in Alingar and Pashtun Zarghun South.
Kabul: DACAAR. 2004.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.; Alden Wily, Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistan, op cit.
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sites attention should also be drawn to
differences between villages. It should be
remembered that although these villages are
relatively near to each other within each
site, village asset portfolios differ, and this
affects how land assets are distributed
between households within the village. An
understanding of village history and social
relations would be needed to explain, for
example, the land distribution patterns of
village three in Kandahar in relation to village
two, where all of the land in the village is
held by one prominent family. As seen in the
example from Herat, village histories and
social relations may include an understanding
of cross village land relations, since land
ownership in one village may be held by
people who live in another.
As discussed in the methods chapter, the land
size denoting wealth differs greatly between
sites, with 80 jeribs of irrigated land denoting
wealth in one area and 1-5 jeribs in another.
Also, although households are assigned to
wealth groups, based on characteristics such
as land ownership, households within a wealth
group differ. For example, in poorer wealth
groups there are households with a small
amount of land as well as households with
no land, meaning that different households
in the same wealth group may have different
livelihood strategies for accessing grain and
for coping with risk. The evidence also shows
that some households beg for their grain
needs, while other households with the same
land holdings, or lack of, do not. The size of
land holdings is not always enough to
determine household livelihood outcomes. It
is important to remember that skills,
education, household composition and social
networks, among other factors, have a role
in determining outcomes.
Overall, the land ownership data highlight
five key points: First, a majority of households
across all sites obtain a minority (less than
25%) of their grain from their own farm
production. Second, most of these households
are in the lower wealth groups (WGII and
below), although this depends on site
characteristics. Third, households in WGIII,
despite being the majority of the household
sample, tend to own a minority of the land
area. Fourth, households both not owning
and not cultivating land are almost exclusively
found in WGIII and below.  Fifth, women own
far less land than men.
4.3 Livestock ownership
The evidence from land ownership raises
important questions about where households
who obtain most of their food supplies from
the market and have limited or no land
holdings, obtain their income. The evidence
from this project shows that it is not from
livestock.
Table 8 summarises the mean number of
sheep and goats held by each wealth group
and the percentage of the total sheep and
goat flocks that are owned by sample
households. The data on sheep and goats
have been selected on the grounds that
numerically these are the most important
livestock holdings.
Caution should be expressed with respect to
the idea of “ownership,” as it is not as
straightforward as might be presumed. In
Table 7: Percentage of joint ownership of land
in landed households by site











31 Kerr-Wilson and Pain, op cit.
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rights to production change over time and
rights are both actual and potential.31 This
is largely due to practices that allow livestock-
poor households to look after the livestock
of other households and be paid through the
progeny. Evidence of this has also been found
in Faryab,32 but there is a need for further
research into this practice elsewhere in
Afghanistan.
Data on cattle, including draught power, are
not presented for the reason that mean cattle
holdings, except in Badakhshan and Faryab,
are small (1-2 per household and often less
for WGIII households), and not the main
income source in terms of livestock. In two
of the three Faryab villages, WGIII households
own no cattle, while in Badakhshan only 14-
33 percent of WGIII households have cattle
holdings.  Data on donkey ownership are also
not included. Across all villages there is less
than one donkey per household in WGIII. This
is not to deny the importance of these types
of livestock.  Indeed, both cows and donkeys
are highly important, the former for household
nutrition from dairy produce and the latter
in terms of carrying water and other goods.
32 Pain, A. Livelihoods Under Stress in Faryab Province, Northern Afghanistan, Opportunities for Support. Pakistan/Afghanistan:
Save the Children USA. 2001.
Table 8: Mean number of sheep and goats owned by site, village and wealth group (percent of
total livestock holding of household sample per village in brackets)




V1 7 (21%) 6.5 (65%) 0.6 (12%) 60
V2 74 (76%) 9 (13%) 2.8 (11%) 293
V3 42.5 (64%) 5.8 (17%) 6.4 (19%) 267
Faryab
V1 72.4 (53%) 46 (33%) 12 (14%) 688
V2 83 (87%) 12 (13%) 0.2 (0%) 477
V3 4 (30%) 5.2 (63%) 0.7 (7%) 67
Ghazni
V1 1 (13%) 0.5 (33%) 1.1 (53%) 15
V2 5 (15%) 2.5 (15%) 2.3 (41%) 0.9 (29%) 34
V3 1 (14%) 6.6 (67%) 1.1 (18%) 49
Herat
V1 2.5 (62.5) 0.7 (25%) 0.1 (12.5%) 0 8
V2 0 3.1 (65%) 1 (35%) 0 17
V3 0 0 0 0 0
Kandahar
V1 61 (67%) 7.4 (28%) 0.8 (5%) 183
V2 0 6.8 (52%) 2.2 (48%) 65
V3 0 0.3 (100%) 6
Laghman
V1 2 (67%) 0.2 (8%) 0.5 (25%) 12
V2 1 (9%) 0 2 (91%) 22
V3 0 3.1 (100%) 0 40
Saripul
V1 13 (55%) 4.7 (45%) 0 73
V2 35 (57%) 16 (43%) 0 0 185
V3 8.3 (37%) 4.2 (62%) 0.1 (1.4%) 68
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goat ownership is fairly clear:
• Ghazni, Herat and Laghman have minimal
sheep and goat flocks (50 or less per
village). These are also the sites where
mean land holdings are small (no greater
than seven jeribs and usually three or
less) across all wealth groups.
• Kandahar and Saripul have moderate
holdings of sheep and goats (50 – 200
per village). In village one in Kandahar
and village two in Saripul ownership is
skewed towards the higher wealth
groups.
• In the remaining two sites of Badakhshan
and Faryab two of the villages in each
site have more than 250 sheep and goats
and in these villages ownership is strongly
skewed towards the higher wealth
groups.
The difference between sites in part reflects
the traditional importance of livestock as a
livelihood in certain areas.  For example, the
people of one of the villages in Faryab have
traditionally been very involved in livestock
rearing and this is how these people identify
themselves.
The evidence indicates that poorer wealth
groups have minimal livestock holdings across
all sites. Thus limited land and livestock
holdings are characteristics of poorer wealth
groups.
Women’s ownership of livestock is far less
than that of men’s.  Including cattle, draught
power, sheep and goats, donkey and chickens,
ownership solely by women accounts for 24
percent, male ownership for 54 percent and
joint ownership for 22 percent. This picture
is somewhat distorted by including chickens,
which are generally considered to be owned
by women and which have a much lower cash
value. The picture is also skewed by the fact
that most livestock owned in the three Ghazni
villages is considered to be jointly owned,
which makes the amount of joint ownership
overall look far greater. Analysing cattle,
sheep and goats only changes the statistical
picture, with only 11 percent of households
containing women who own cattle, sheep
and goats. There also appears to be some
difference between wealth groups, with
poorer wealth groups containing higher
numbers of households in which women own
livestock. This may be in part due to the
larger number of WGIII female-headed
households, as 10 of the 24 female-headed
households own some livestock, usually one
goat or one cow.
Women, therefore, tend to own far less land
and far less livestock, though again what this
ownership, or lack of, really means in practice
is not completely understood.  What is
apparent, however, is that it is more common
for women to own livestock than land. The
data on activities also show that women are
very involved in livestock management.
Neither this ownership, nor women’s role in
livestock management, appears to be
reflected in a majority of programming linked
to livestock. Projects targeting women rarely
extend their remit beyond chickens, which
are notoriously prone to disease, and generate
little income compared to other types of
livestock.
The evidence on grain budgets, land assets
and livestock holdings all point to agriculture
having a limited role in supplying, directly
or indirectly, grain for a significant number
of poorer households. This finding raises an
essential question – how are people obtaining
income?
4.4 Household income portfolios
This section examines the issue of income
diversity and the relative contribution of
different income sources, before exploring
specific income sources.  Information on the
importance of different income sources was
obtained by a ranking exercise for each season
during the previous year. This method was
chosen because quantitative data on income
are difficult to obtain and their reliability is
uncertain.  It should also be noted that the
contribution of income in-kind – the
subsistence component from farm production
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is only referring to cash sources of income.
The income categories are: farm labour, non-
farm labour, livestock sales, farm sales,
remittance, carpets and gilims, credit and
loans, land mortgage, wild plants, trade and
transport, and other asset sales. The data
discussed are combined from all four seasons.
4.4.1 Livelihoods diversity
To develop a picture of livelihoods diversity,
the overall number of income sources is
analysed against the contribution the largest
income source made to the total income.
This is determined by using a very crude
measure of counts, i.e., the number of times
an income source is reported.  This does not
tell us the amount of income from each
source nor does it give an indication of return
for effort or time expended (both important
issues in understanding the relative return
of different activities). Non-farm labour, for
example, may well be different (or not) for
a WGI household compared to a WGIII
household.
From the data collected on livelihoods
diversity, there are a number of key
observations:
• The majority of households have
diversified income sources. 18 percent
of sample households have one to two
income sources, 34 percent have three
to four income sources, 30 percent have
five to six income sources, and 17 percent
have more than seven income sources.
Overall, nearly 50 percent have five or
more income sources.
• At one end of the spectrum are wealth
groups that obtain income from one or
two sources, either of which contributes
more than 50 percent to total income.
Groups across all wealth groups and sites
are in this category, except for villages
in Faryab.
33 Ibid.
• At the other end of the spectrum are
seven of the nine wealth groups of Faryab
Province (and WGII from one Badakhshan
village). These wealth groups have more
than seven income sources with no one
source contributing more than 25 percent
of income. In fact, in a number of the
Faryab households there are up to 10
income sources.
• The majority of wealth groups across all
sites have between three and six income
sources. Half of these have one source
contributing more than 50 percent of
income and the other half have one
source contributing between 25 and 50
percent of income.
Diversification of income sources is often
regarded as a strategy of reducing risk in
relation to the reliability and seasonality of
different income sources. It is assumed that
diversification leads to a more regular income
and therefore to income smoothing. The
effectiveness of diversification, of course,
depends on the extent to which there are
choices and opportunities (which often there
are not) and is also determined by the extent
to which one income source is dependent on
another.
It is important to note, however, particularly
under crisis conditions, that the significance
of non-farm income is often positively
correlated with the shocks affecting crop or
livestock income. As agricultural incomes
collapse, so do non-farm incomes. A good
example of this is the collapse in carpet
prices in Faryab during the drought:
households shifted into carpet production as
all agricultural options failed, leading to an
expansion of production, and a sharp decline
in carpet prices.33
In analysing diversification it is important to
distinguish between diversification undertaken
as a risk coping strategy and, therefore, in
a sense forced, and diversification as a
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Much of the evidence found in other
environments suggests that in practice not
only is diversification a coping strategy, but
also that households may achieve little income
smoothing as a result. This is because incomes
remain highly episodic and unreliable. Thus
diversification may not be taking place
because of risk handling, but because of the
fact that income sources are both short-term
and unreliable and households are simply
seeking to find any form of employment.
There is also a question as to whether it is
the household that is multi-tasking (different
members doing different things over space
and time) or if it is an individual within the
household. If the ability to diversify depends
on household labour, labour poor households
may find it particularly difficult to diversify.
The amount of household labour available
will obviously not only depend on the size of
the household but also on the composition
in terms of age and sex. One man in Sayyad
District, Saripul, for example, spoke of how
he was unable to sharecrop-in land as his
household consisted of himself, his wife and
his young son. His wife took care of their son
and he could not sharecrop-in sufficient land
by himself.
What the data from this study show is that
in the vast majority of households different
members are engaged in diverse income
generating activities. Also, individual
household members are often involved in
varying activities depending on the season,
and this changes depending on the activities
of other household members. However, there
also tends to be household members who are
engaged in similar work all year round. For
example, in carpet weaving households,
women tend to be involved in weaving all
year round. For households with land who do
not sharecrop-out, individual household
members may mostly be involved in
agriculture all year round. The combination
of activities obviously depends on household
size and composition. Chart 1 provides an
example of income source diversification in
a poor household in one of the Faryab villages.
From the limited sample size it is not possible
to identify a link between household size and
wealth status. In some villages, the largest
households are in the wealthiest groups,
while in others they are in the poorest groups.
The effect of household size is likely to be
modified by the asset portfolio of the
household. For example, if a household has
some land and a lot of male members over
the age of 15, it may be possible to use some
of the family labour for working on the land,
while the labour of others can be freed up
to engage in other income generating
activities. Conversely, a family with the same
amount of land, but few adult members, may
not wish to sharecrop-out if the land is small,
and may have to use household labour to
work on the land, resulting in no members
engaging in other activities.
Wealth status and income generating
opportunities will also change during the
course of time. For example, if a female-
headed household has only young children,
obtaining income would be very difficult
without strong social support mechanisms.
However, when the children are old enough
to work, the household’s situation could be
very different. The money either paid or
received during the marriage of children may
also positively or negatively affect a household
depending on the sex of the child, with
households generally receiving money for
daughters and paying money for the marriage
of sons. Whether a household is headed by
a man or a widow may also affect wealth
status, as women generally have fewer income
generating options. This is obviously not
always the case and will depend on their
assets in terms of land, livestock, children,
skills, savings and social and support
networks.
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(The different colours signify different members and ages: For male: dark orange indicates
senior male, light orange young man, green young boy. For female: red equals senior female,
yellow and pale green both represent young women).
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household and wealth may depend on the
definition of a household being used. For
example, the National Surveillance System
(NSS) found that larger households were
associated with wealth. However, the NSS
defined household as “a group of individuals
sharing income and expenditure and that are
living within the same compound.”  Larger
households were considered to be wealthier,
as more members were able to pool income
and expenditure. Conversely smaller
households, who were not able to pool their
income, and had become separate units,
were considered poorer.34
For poorer households there may be greater
constraints in starting profitable, risk-reducing
diversification. Profitable diversification
generally requires skills and education, which
poor households often do not have. Instead,
poor households tend to move into activities
that have low entry costs, such as firewood
collection, and casual urban and agricultural
employment. It is the households with capital,
skills and probably strong social networks
who can move into shop keeping, livestock
rearing, trade, etc.
Some households who diversify have one main
income source with the other sources acting
as supplementary income. In other
households, each income source may be very
small, but equally as important.  For example,
CARE found that in the Ghazni villages
livestock is a key income source, yet looking
at the small numbers of livestock owned this
is not immediately apparent. This shows the
importance of understanding locally a
household’s range of income sources. If only
livestock numbers were examined, a very
different understanding of the importance
of livestock as a coping strategy for Ghazni
villages may have been obtained.
Having looked at income diversification, it
is important to examine the nature of income
sources.
4.4.2 Income sources
Table 9 summarises the most important
reported income sources. Box 1 (top left hand
corner) shows that for the nine wealth groups
found in this box, seven reported non-farm
labour, one reported wood and the other
reported crop sales as their greatest source
of income.
There are several key points to be made in
relation to the data.  First, for nearly 54
percent of wealth groups the most important
source of income is non-farm labour,35
whether it is wealth groups with only one to
two or five to six sources of income. For
wealth groups that have more than seven
income sources, only 30 percent reported
non-farm labour as the most important source.
Looking at cash income sources alone does
not necessarily mean that non-farm labour
is the most important income source. For
example, if a household obtains most cash
income from non-farm labour, but is fulfilling
its food needs from its own production, then
farming may still be the most important
income source. However, when the main cash
income source is compared with whether the
household accesses the majority of its grain
from its own production, or from the market
or other means, together with the number
of months the households are said to be food
self-sufficient, a fairly consistent picture
emerges. The majority of the poorest wealth
groups obtain grain from means other than
their own production, are food self-sufficient
for only a very small part of the year, and
obtain their main cash income from non-farm
labour (see Appendix 2 for a breakdown of
food self-sufficiency and main cash incomes).
Non-farm labour is also the main income
source for some of the richest wealth groups
in particular areas.
More specifically, in 18 out of the 21 villages
studied non-farm labour is the most important
34 Personal communication with Wendy Johnecheck.
35 Non-farm labour is used here to refer to work that is not agricultural, either on-farm or off-farm.
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groups. In 12 villages, the main income source
for the second poorest wealth groups is also
non-farm labour. In six villages it is also the
main income source for the wealthiest groups.
This is not to say that non-farm labour is the
only source of income at the household level
for these poor households. As already
discussed, households have diverse income
sources, including farm labour, livestock and
crop sales, both in cash and in-kind.
Farm sales are the major income source for
19 percent of wealth groups. This is largely
confined to being the major source of income
for WGI; the exception to this is Badakhshan,
where most wealth groups rely on farm sales,
which is probably because almost all wealth
groups sell opium poppy.
There appears to be little sale of grain under
the farm sales category. For example, in
Table 9: The most important income source (ranked first by the greatest number of households
within a wealth group) by diversity (number) of income sources
Contribution of largest single income source
100% 1. (N = 9) 2. (N = 4) 3. 4.
Non-farm labour (7) Non-farm labour (3)
Wood (1) Crop Sales
Crop Sales (1)
75% 5. (N = 3) 6. (N = 10) 7. (N = 3) 8.
Non-farm labour (3) Non-farm labour (4) Non-farm labour (2)




50% 9. (N = 2) 10. (N = 10) 11. (N = 14) 12. (N = 6)
Crop Sales Non-farm labour (5) Non-farm labour (9) Non-farm labour (4)
Non-farm labour Crop Sales (4) Crop Sales (3) Credit (2)
Livestock Livestock
Credit Credit
25% 13. 14. 15. (N = 1) 16. (N = 8)





0 1-2 3-4 5-6 >7
Number of income sources
N = Number of wealth groups in the box
Faryab most farm sales are from the sale of
fruit rather than from wheat. Only 10
households reported selling wheat and only
four reported selling rice. While the numbers
seem extremely low, this may in part be the
result of under-reporting, but given that few
households are food self-sufficient it is not
surprising that they are not selling grain.
People may also be storing grain in the hope
that the sale price of wheat will increase.
The importance of non-farm income may
have increased in importance due to war and
drought, but there is nothing to suggest that
non-farm labour has not been important for
a long time for poor households. What is not
known is if agricultural production improves
will this continue? This will obviously depend
on the type of agricultural development. For
example, if mechanisation continues then
the importance of non-farm labour for those
with little or no land may continue and
increase due to fewer opportunities for farm
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 32
Synthesis Paper Serieslabour. As the research team heard during
field trips to Faryab and Saripul, if wheat
prices are low people may wish to move away
from sharecropping to a combination of farm
and non-farm labour.
It must be noted, as was discussed in the
methods chapter, that it is unclear what
exactly the category of non-farm labour
actually entails. For example, while there
was a separate category for remittances,
DACAAR found in their follow-up research
that the two categories had been confused,
and that remittances from migrant non-farm
labour had come under the heading of non-
farm labour. This may mean that adequate
information on how important income from
migrant labour, both inside and outside
Afghanistan, has not been captured. It is
certain, however, that more than a quarter
of households (27 percent) had at least one
member away for at least one month of the
year (see Table 10).
The highest percentages of households with
members working as migrant labour are found
in Ghazni, Badakhshan and Laghman. Many
of those from the Badakhshan villages are
migrating to local villages for fuel collection
rather than paid work. The flow of migrant
workers from Badakhshan to other provinces,
such as Kunduz, is believed to have been
curbed by the growth in poppy cultivation in
Badakhshan, which has created incentives
for working in Badakhshan rather than
outside.36
Herat and Saripul have the smallest
percentage of households with members
working outside the village. The villages in
Herat and Saripul are among those with the
fewest income sources, as compared to
Faryab, and one village in Badakhshan.
Migrant labour may, therefore, occur more
in households that have diversified income
sources, though again this will depend on the
ability of the household to send a member
away to work. With the exceptions of Faryab
Table 10: Non-resident member activities by wealth group
Province Percentage of households with Activities Location of
at least one non-resident migration
member by wealth group
WGI WGII WGIII WGIV
Badakhshan 0 43 33 62.5 Casual labour, firewood Nearby villages;
collection, fuel Taloqan Province;
collection Pakistan
Ghazni 15 48 42 N/a Casual labour, skilled Ghazni City;
labour, tailoring Kandahar; Iran;
Pakistan
Herat 0 0 17 17 Casual labour Iran
Faryab 31 19 22 N/a Skilled labour, casual Iran
labour, firewood
collection
Kandahar 20 13 8 N/a Driving, casual labour, Kandahar City;
waiter Kabul; Pakistan
Laghman 14 43 29 N/a Casual labour, skilled Iran; Pakistan
labour
Saripul 11 4.5 22 0 Casual labour, Sayyad;
shepherding Sheberghan;
Pakistan; Iran
36 Pain, A. The Impact of the Opium Poppy Economy on Household Livelihoods: Evidence from the Wakhan Corridor and
Khustak Valley in Badakhshan, Kabul: AKDN, 2004.
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from a position of strength) and Kandahar,
migrant labour appears to be higher in poorer
wealth groups (WGII-IV).
In terms of income generated by women and
children it is unclear to what extent their
activities are captured under non-farm labour.
The questionnaire included a separate
category for carpet/gilim weaving, but it is
likely that some weaving as well as sewing,
tailoring and embroidery are included in the
non-farm labour category.  In a study on
gender roles in agriculture, women’s carpet
weaving was the biggest source of income in
some poor households in two villages in
Daulatabad, Faryab.37 Since the drought
carpet and gilim weaving have, however,
become quite exploitative in these villages
(see Box 2). The evidence does not indicate
if children, particularly from poorer wealth
groups, are involved in non-farm production
nor does it capture domestic household
activities. Yet in carpet-weaving villages girls
as young as 10 are involved, while boys,
usually around the age of 14, are also involved
in non-farm income generating activities,
such as carrying goods in the local bazaar.
This is particularly the case in Kandahar,
possibly due to the closer proximity of the
villages to an urban area.
From this study, the vast majority of women
are involved in production and income
generating activities such as carpet weaving,
gilim weaving, sewing, embroidery and
tailoring as well as other activities such as
agricultural work (both on crops as well as
livestock management), and making dairy
products. These activities largely take place
within the village, although there are
exceptions (see Box 3). The study on gender
roles in agriculture also found that while
these activities do generate income, with
the exception of carpet weaving, the income
is very small and unlikely to be sufficient to
support a family. This is in part due to the
fact that most women are not linked into
markets and do not have business or marketing
skills.
The question that arises out of the prevalence
of non-farm labour is why do so many rural
households engage in non-farm activities. A
combination of factors appear to affect
whether household members work in non-
farm labour:
• Whether the household owns land of
sufficient quality and size with adequate
access to water. As has already been
demonstrated, many poor households,
and some richer households, have very
Box 2: New terms of trade in carpet weaving
Women in Faryab said they had always weaved carpets, but they are weaving more now than in
the past. They cite the drought as well as the Taliban as reasons for this. When the Taliban
soldiers came to the village the women were not allowed to work on the land, and livestock as
well as land were taken. During this time carpet traders encouraged women in these villages to
weave more carpets to sell.
Before the drought, some households from Daulatabad would use the wool from their own livestock
for carpet weaving and were therefore less reliant on outside traders for raw materials. Since
the drought, and with the decline in livestock numbers, many women and their families have
become tied into receiving raw materials from middlemen, mainly in Andkhoi, and making carpets
to order. In return they often receive half the profit minus the cost of raw materials. Many of
these women now make less profit than in the past. Some households have also become trapped
in a cycle of debt, whereby the middleman provides a loan to tide the household over until the
carpet is sold. Once the carpet is sold, the household repays the loan from the profit, and once
more needs to take out a loan.
37 Grace, Gender Roles and Agriculture, op cit.
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access to irrigation is also problematic.
• Whether farm work is available, which
may be linked at the local level to the
size of land holdings and the size and
composition of the landholder’s family,
determining whether there is enough
family labour to work the land.
• The skills of household members. For
example, becoming a sharecropper
without experience is very difficult.
Alternatively, if people have skills such
as carpentry, carpet weaving or masonry
they may be able to earn higher wages
than from farm labour.
• For women, especially wealthier and
younger women, mobility and socio-
cultural stigmas attached to them
working on the land in certain areas may
limit their work on farms (though they
may still be involved in many agricultural
activities inside the home).
• Poorer households often need regular
income to use for daily expenditures,
making activities such as sharecropping
difficult without seeking loans.
• Wage differentials for farm and non-farm
work. If wages are higher for non-farm
work this may pull people into this type
of work.
• The fact that farm work is not available
all year round.
Whether non-farm labour is undertaken inside
or outside the village will depend not only
on the availability of work, but also on wage
differences inside and outside the village.
Seasonality is also a major factor impacting
on rural livelihoods, as it determines what
types of work are available and necessary
(see Box 4).  It is very important to know not
only what people are doing but also who is
doing the activities and when.
4.5 Expenditure
This chapter began by looking at where
households obtain their grain and concluded
that the market is the most important source
for a majority of wealth groups. This section
examines in more detail expenditure patterns
at the village and wealth group level. As with
Box 3: A business women in Faryab
One widow buys material from a trader in a nearby village and sells it to women in Quraish. This
widow had no carpet weaving skills, unlike most other women in the villages, due to her family
circumstances when she was a child. She was born into a landless family, the youngest of four
sisters, who were all married young, and with a brother who was deaf and dumb. As a result, she
had to work outside the house as a child grazing other people’s animals and thus she never learned
the skills of carpet weaving from which she could have earned income.
She now makes a living partly from selling the material she obtains from the trader, for which
she receives 10 Afs per item, and partly from charity given to her by the village. She travels by
donkey to a neighbouring village and buys material from the trader whom she says is sympathetic
to her situation. Her daughter has learned the skills of carpet weaving and her son-in-law, who
lives with her, works as a farm labour on wheat fields. Her eldest son, who is 14, started work
as a farm labourer this year.
This woman was able to start trading material through the help of another woman who did this.
This women saw her crying and asked what was wrong. It was after she heard her story that she
taught her the required business skills.
This widow was married at 17 to a 55-year-old man. She was widowed 17 years later (7 years
ago). By the time the other woman met her she had been a widow for 2 years and was in despair
over how to make an income. With 4 children (6 others died) she was determined not to beg.
Source: Grace, J. 2004
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 35
Rethinking Rural Livelihoods in Afghanistanthe income data, information on expenditure
was gained through a ranking system,
identifying the most important household
expenditures, for each season during the
previous year. This has been aggregated for
the whole year through a weighted scoring
system38 in order to capture a picture of
village expenditure patterns, which are
summarised in Table 11. This hides patterns
of difference between wealth groups, which
will be discussed later.
Table 11 includes the most common items of
expenditure across villages. Notably absent
from the list is payments for taxation, which
was not reported by any household. The
loaning out of money was only reported in
very few cases.
Not surprisingly, across all sites and villages
expenditure on food is ranked first in
importance. In only a few cases, and these
are a few households in WGI in Kandahar,
Herat and Faryab, is expenditure on food not
the most important item. There is no
information on the nature of the food
Box 4: Combinations of farm and non-farm labour in Saripul and Faryab
In a village in Saripul one man carries out work such as bringing water, protecting wheat and
melon fields and weeding for three months in the summer. He also grazes people’s livestock for
money and milk. After the agricultural work is finished he works on other types of day labour.
People know he does this kind of work and approach him to carry out various tasks such as
construction. In November he goes to Sheberghan and Mazar-e-Sharif for non-farm day labour
until spring, and receives Afs 150 compared to Afs 70-100 in the village.  He had been a sharecropper
before the drought but these opportunities are now fewer as landlords are cultivating their own
land.  He also lost his oxen during the drought.
A village in Faryab, which is upstream to other villages visited in Daulatabad, has more water
available and as a result non-farm activities such as brick-making are possible. One man interviewed
was making bricks to order as well as carrying out construction work on other people’s houses
and canal cleaning.  He only had one son and his wife was busy with housework as there was no
one else to help her, so she was unable to weave carpets.  During the brick-making period he
saves some of the income to use in winter when this work is not possible.  
Source: Grace, J. 2004
expenditure – is it on wheat, rice or other
food items? While not all NGOs were able to
collect information on amounts of
expenditure, information from those who
could shows that the poorest groups
sometimes had the highest expenditures as
well as cash income. This is because they
generally receive cash payments and spend
cash on food, which means they are probably
more dependent on the cash economy and
susceptible to changes in food prices.39
A second distinct expenditure feature is the
repayment of loans, and in the case of Faryab,
Badakhshan and Laghman the acquisition of
assets. This issue of debts and changes in
assets is addressed in more detail in the next
section.
Expenditure on education takes place in some
households across all sites, although ranking
usually at least fourth or less in importance.
In contrast, for many villages expenditure on
health is the second or third most important
item of expenditure. It is unclear what this
health expenditure means, although a more
38 A ranking system summing the household rankings for each income source and weighted by wealth group according to the
number of positive answers.
39 This is also reflected in the studies by Christoplos and also by Lautze, et al.
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Herat indicates some of the issues (see
Box 5).
Anecdotal evidence suggests that physical
health issues may also be related to certain
livelihoods such as carpet weaving.  Poor
eyesight, body pain and breathing difficulties
are all common complaints made by those
who weave carpets. It is also believed that
many women use opium to ease the pain they
feel from carpet weaving and to enable them
to weave for longer. Handicraft production
can also cause severe eyestrain and weaken
eyesight, with the possible result of reducing
a woman’s income generation possibilities.
Table 11: Ranking of household expenditure
Province/ Food Fuel Farm Inputs Clothes Education Health Repay Buy
Village Loans Assets
Badakhshan
V1 1 4 2 3 5 6
V2 1 2 6 3 4 5
V3 1 5 4 2 3 6 7 8
Faryab
V1 1 8 5 3 4 2 7 6
V2 1 7 3 8 2 4 6
V3 1 6 7 3 5 2 8 4
Ghazni
V1 1 7 6 2 4 3 5
V2 1 2 7 2 5 4 6
V3 1 6 2 3 4 5
Herat
V1 1 5 3 2 6 4
V2 1 7 2 4 5 3
V3 1 5 4 3 6 2
Kandahar
V1 1 4 6 3 7 2
V2 1 6 3 4 5 2
V3 1 8 3 4 5 2 6
Laghman
V1 1 3 4 6 2 5 7
V2 1 4 6 3 5 2 7
V3 1 3 4 5 2 5 7
Saripul
V1 1 2 3 5 4
V2 1 6 5 3 4 2
V3 1 6 2 3 4 5
Ill health can seriously affect people’s
livelihoods, as one household member usually
has to care for the ill person rather than
engaging in income generating activities,
which results in two household members
being unable to work. Ill health can also
severely impact on livelihoods as it may
require the household to go into debt to pay
for medical treatment (this will be discussed
further in the next section on debt).
Another aspect of health expenditure not
captured here is that of the effectiveness of
treatment and medical advice. It is widely
reported that pharmaceuticals in Afghanistan
are ineffective and people may therefore be
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medication.40
Expenditure on fuel features quite widely;
it is ranked as a more significant item of
expenditure in high altitude places
(Badakhshan, Ghazni and Laghman). In some
ways this is a surprising finding given the
observational evidence of fuel collection in
many locations by many households and the
reports of fuel collection at particular times
of the year. In part this may reflect a shortage
of fuel as a consequence of the drought, but
this probably needs more detailed
corroboration.  It may also suggest that
households collect fuel types such as wood
for sale and purchase or gather cheaper fuels
for their own use.
Expenditure on farm inputs features across
all sites, but the village level aggregation
has hidden the distributional dimensions of
this. Expenditure on farm inputs is ranked
higher for WGI households than for WGIII
households, for whom it features much lower,
if at all. The exception to this is Badakhshan
where the proportion of sharecropping-in, as
a result of opium poppy cultivation, combined
with the requirements of planting poppy,
gives farm inputs a particular significance.
4.6 Debts
A significant feature of household expenditure
is the repayment of loans, and from this study
it appears that large numbers of rural
households are indebted. From the data,
there are two key dimensions of debt to be
analysed: (i) the extent to which land is
mortgaged, and (ii) the extent of cash and
food debts households carry.
On the issue of mortgaged land, the evidence
is that the amount of land that is mortgaged
is very small. In four sites – Faryab, Ghazni,
Kandahar and Laghman – no households have
any land under mortgage. For the other three
sites, some households have land under
mortgage. In Herat, one WGI household, from
village three, has one jerib mortgaged. Two
WGIII households from village two in Saripul
had a total of seven and a half jeribs under
mortgage. In Badakhshan, three WGIII
households, from village one, had a total of
five jeribs mortgaged. In village three
(Badakhshan) another three households, again
in WGIII, had a total of three jeribs under
mortgage. There may be different reasons
for mortgaging land, but the majority of the
above cases appear to be the result of
drought.  Payment for the treatment of an
Box 5: Health expenditure in Laghman and Herat
In Laghman and Herat, households are spending between nine and 26 percent of income on health,
with poorer households genrally spending more than richer households. While there is little
difference between the amounts spent on health between seasons, spending on health is generally
higher in winter.
Reasons for these health problems may include poor housing and sanitation conditions, poor
nutrition, the young age at which girls are married and begin having children as well as mental
health problems due to war and poverty.
To pay for these illnesses households operate a range of strategies from mortgaging out land,
taking loans, migrating abroad to earn money for treatment, and selling valuables.
Source: Adapted from Kerr-Wilson, A. and Ghafori, J. 2004
40 Karimi, A. The Pharmaceutical System in Afghanistan. Unpublished Draft. Kabul: AREU. 2004.
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a reason for mortgaging land. Indeed, one
woman said she had mortgaged land as well
as borrowed a substantial amount of money
to pay for her husband’s illness.
In the case of Badakhshan, anecdotal evidence
suggests that the reason for some households
engaging in poppy production is to earn
enough money to get their land out of
mortgage. Three households did manage to
retrieve their land, but whether this was due
the sale of poppy is unclear.
The evidence on other forms of debt gives a
rather different picture.  Table 12 summarises
the debts that households reported holding
at the time of the first interview. The data
refer only to cash debts. This is because only
a minority of debts were reported as being
in grain, and these were largely found in
areas of surplus grain production, namely
Faryab (across all three villages) and Saripul
(in village two). Grain debts typically ranged
from 20 to 60 seers of wheat, while the
maximum debt was 100 seers of wheat. Given
that the main reason for taking out loans was
food, it is somewhat surprising that households
mostly took out loans in cash. This may be
explained by people having to make
repayments in cash for loans in food. Or, it
could be explained by an apparent lack of
household surplus grain. If on the other hand
people prefer loans in cash, perhaps because
they see cash as a more stable currency than
food, then this may have some relevance for
the food-for-work versus cash-for-work
debate. For instance, would this play a part
in people’s decisions over whether to
participate in public works programmes
depending on whether cash or food was being
offered?
As Table 12 shows, debts are not confined
to households in WGIII, but are in fact found
across all sites and wealth groups. In some
villages, households in WGI have a greater
level of debt, while in other villages WGII
and WGIII have a higher number of households
with debt. The same mixed picture emerges
with regards to mean values of debts, and it
is important that debts are considered against
the asset portfolio and income level of each
household and wealth group.
Mean values of debt must be handled with
caution with respect to interpretation, since
the motivation and reasons for taking loans
– and hence its significance – may vary greatly.
For example, if we contrast the reasons for
taking out loans between households (see
Chart 2), it can be seen that WGI take a
higher proportion of loans for ceremonies
(mostly weddings) and for
productive/investment purposes such as
buying land and livestock compared to WGIII.
WGIII takes out more loans for basic
necessities such as food and health, with
debts for health often being quite large,
depending on the treatment needed. Poorer
households, in comparison to wealthier
households, are not obtaining loans that will
bring them income, which will enable them
to repay the loans.  Poorer households are
taking out loans as a coping strategy, while
richer households are to some extent seeking
loans in order to improve their livelihoods.
Loans for food may also be taken for seasonal
consumption smoothing, and this practice is
not always negative. Loans for consumption
smoothing can be a very important income
source for households, particularly as a lack
of access to credit may be detrimental if it
leads to the sale of assets. A study conducted
in Kabul showed that a majority of households
in the sample without debt had not taken
loans because no one would provide them
with credit; these households were deemed
too poor to be able to repay.41 Debt can,
however, be a detrimental coping strategy,
if it leads to the sale of assets or mortgaging
of land to make repayments. There is a need
to learn more about the nature of loans and
debts: Who is able to access credit? Are
41 Grace, J.  One Hundred Households in Kabul: A Study of Winter Vulnerability, Coping Strategies, and the Impact of Cash-
for –Work Programmes. Kabul: AREU, 2003. Also, see Alden Wily, L. Faryab Land Case Study. Draft. Kabul: AREU. 2004.
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site, village and wealth group
Province/ WGI WGII WGIII WGIV Total
Village Weighted Mean
Badakhshan
V1 66% (6,250) 33% (11,500) 50% (10,416)
V2 0 40% (59,000) 42% (10,000)
V3 25% (5,000) 50%  (5,467) 25% (4,200)
33% (8,750) 33% (16,400) 37% (9,195) 11,424 (12,927)
Faryab
V1 60% (57,500) 57% (173,250) 88% (81,666)
V2 40% (100,000) 80% (28,125) 88% (21,950)
V3 60% (27,500) 63% (8,100) 57% (17,975)
53% (51,312) 65% (65,077) 76% (17,530) 51,137 (72,248)
Ghazni
V1 100% (23,000) 82% (24,222) 86% (17,167)
V2 0 0 50% (6,000) 82% (24,327)
V3 29% (65,000) 60% (54,333) 62.5 (85,000)
40% (46,560) 80% (24,937) 63% (17,530) 23,390 (22,103)
Herat
V1 50% (40,000) 66% (75,000) 63% (28,500) 0
V2 100% (26,667) 66% (20,000) 71% (16,240) 100% (40,000)
V3 50% (20,000) 0 66% (51,780) 50% (3,000)
71% (26,000) 50% (47,500) 66% (28,381) 50% (27,667) 30,611 (34,702)
Kandahar
V1 100% (215,000) 86% (56,767) 82% (45,278)
V2 0 40% (375,000) 71% (47,580)
V3 50% (800,000) 89% (358,850)
60% (410,000) 77% (145,678) 76% (58,105) 126,324 (229,527)
Laghman
V1 75% (11,000) 60% (36,000) 100% (17,417)
V2 0 100% (23,300) 80% (70,250)
V3 100% (10,000) 77% (18,930) 100% (7,000)
57% (68,250) 76% (24,643) 88% (45,080) 38,386 (63,159)
Saripul
V1 66%(65,00) 40% (22,500) 40% (6,500)
V2 66% (20,000) 60% (12,500) 80% (16,000) 67% (15,667)
V3 33% (7,700) 50% (7,200) 50% (6,000)
44% (101,750) 41% (11,893) 52% (8,167) 10,455 (7,831)
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What happens if they default? What are the
terms and conditions of a loan?
It is worth noting that the time when
households became indebted featured strongly
in the household history of many of the sample
groups. This indicates that people view the
time when they were indebted as a very
serious and significant life event.
So where are households obtaining loans
from? Table 13 shows the main sources for
loans by wealth group and combines all sites.
Relatives are the main source of credit across
all wealth groups. This could be indicative
of a lack of alternative credit sources, and
the difficulty poor households have in
obtaining credit from other sources. Obtaining
loans from friends is also a major source for
WGII-IV. This indicates that access to social
networks is highly important for access to
loans in times of need. Shopkeepers and
traders provided the second largest source
of loans for WGI and the third for WGII-IV.
41 Grace, J.  One Hundred Households in Kabul: A Study of Winter Vulnerability, Coping Strategies, and the Impact of Cash-
for –Work Programmes. Kabul: AREU, 2003. Also, see Alden Wily, L. Faryab Land Case Study. Draft. Kabul: AREU. 2004.
There are differences in terms of the major
sources of loans between wealth groups in
different sites. For example, AKDN found
that the wealthier households were more
able to access loans from family members,
while the poorer households borrowed more
from traders, presumably at less advantageous
terms. The ability for households to access
loans from family members will depend on
the ability of family members to provide
loans and is again linked to the social capital
of the household.
What is unclear from the data collected is
the effect the giving of loans has on the
lender. Do families feel obliged to provide
loans? Is it seen as a form of saving, in that
the debtor household/person will then be
more likely to lend them money/food in times
Chart 2: Reasons for loans held by
households by wealth groups
Table 13: Source of loan by wealth groups with
loans
Loan Source  WGI (35) WGII (147) WGIII/IV (170)
Relatives 21 (60%) 78 (53%) 82 (48.23%)
Friends 3 (8.6%) 44 (29.9%) 43 (25.29%)
Shop/traders 6 (17.1%) 20 (13.6%) 30 (17.64%)
Businessmen 0 1 (0.68%) 2 (1.17%)
Villager 3 (8.6%) 2 (1.36%) 8 (4.7%)
Other  2 (5.7%) 1 (0.68%) 3 (1.76%)
Landlord 0 1 (0.68%) 1 (0.58%)
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contexts?
4.6.1 Debts and change over time
Analysing changes in debt levels during the
period of monitoring can be undertaken by
looking at the number of households in debt
and the mean level of cash debt they hold.
Table 14 summarises the evidence on changes
in debt during the period of monitoring.
Looking at Badakhshan, the debt levels for
WGI and WGII in all villages either stayed the
same or declined, both in terms of the number
of households in debt and the mean level of
cash debt.  For WGIII households in village
one, the number of households in debt and
the mean level increased, the latter by about
three times.  For village two, the number of
households in debt in WGIII declined by about
eight percentage points, although the mean
level of debt increased by over two times.
In the case of village three, the number of
households in debt jumped by 50 percent,
but the level of debt declined by about 50
percent. There is evidence that for households
in WGIII, new debts are being taken on once
some old debts have been paid off.
Key:    =decline;     =increase; no arrow means no change; * refers to no data
Table 14: Changes in debt level: percent of households with debts and the mean value of cash
debts in Afs
Province/Village WGI WGII WGIII WGIV
Badakhshan
V1 66% (6,250)  33% (  5,000) 58% (  34,357)
V2 0 25% (  49,000) 33% (  23,550)
V3 0% 37.5% (  3,667) 50% (  2,262)
Faryab
V1 80%(  28,250) 57% (  114,500) 63% (  39,700)
V2 40% (100,000) 80% (  22,500) 75% (  24,483)
V3 60% (30,000) 63% (  6,300) 100% (  8,614)
Ghazni
V1 * * *
V2 * * *
V3 * * *
Herat
V1 50% (40,000) 66% (75,000) 57% (29,373) 0
V2 100% (26,666) 66% (  40,000) 71% (  27,041) 100% (  52,500)
V3 50% (20,000) 0 66% (  43,583) 59% (3,000)
Kandahar
V1 100% (  290,000) 71% (  51,920) 72% (  75,062)
V2 0 40% (37,500) 71% (48,150)
V3 50% (80,000) 94% (  64,411)
Laghman
V1 100% (  25,750) 60%    (  60,000) 100% (  25,667)
V2 0 100%  (  108,333) 90% (  131,062)
V3 100%   (  60,000) 85% (  160,564) 100% (7,000)
Saripul
V1 * * *
V2 0% 20% (?20,000) 20% (  25,000) 50% (  6,667)
V3 0% 30% (?4,189) 38% (  8,000)
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households from Faryab, Herat and Kandahar,
with the number of households in debt and
the level of cash debt largely staying the
same or declining. For WGIII households the
picture is more mixed and depends on the
village as to whether the percent of
households in debt increased, stayed the
same or declined. The change in the level of
debt also varied for WGIII households
according to village. In Saripul, for the two
villages for which there is data, the number
of households in debt declined across all
wealth groups, although the level of debt
increased in three of the groups.
Unlike the other provinces, in Laghman the
number of households in debt either stayed
the same or increased and the mean level of
debt increased for seven of the nine wealth
groups. For example, in villages two and
three the mean level of debt for WGII
households increased by four and a half and
eight and a half times, respectively. One
explanation for the increase in the level of
debt for village two could be the reportedly
poor performance of the opium economy
during the time of research, which could
have had a significant negative effect on
household economies.  The increase in village
three may be more associated with a ban on
woodcutting, which was a main income source
for households in all wealth groups in this
high altitude village (see Box 6).
While the evidence is suggestive of a decline
in the level of debt in many sites and
particularly for the richer wealth groups, the
rather more mixed picture for poorer wealth
groups and the evidence from Laghman are
not encouraging.
Another asset where changes are found during
the relatively short period of this project is
livestock holdings. Table 15 records the
changes in livestock holdings, which, like the
debt data, present a mixed picture both
across and within sites and between wealth
groups.
It should be remembered that in many sites
and for many wealth groups livestock holdings
were low in the first round of interviews (see
Table 8). Starting from a low base exaggerates
the significance of percentage changes.
However, for the low livestock holding sites
– Herat and Laghman (unfortunately there is
missing data for Ghazni with respect to
changes in livestock holdings) – the direction
of change is largely positive and appears to
be taking place across all wealth groups. In
Herat there have been positive changes,
particularly in cattle numbers, while in
Laghman positive changes have been recorded
for all wealth groups for cattle and other
livestock. This raises interesting questions
as to the nature of debt. In particular, have
loans been taken out to invest in livestock
or do the increases in livestock reflect natural
growth combined with investment? This
cannot be answered with the available data.
In Kandahar, where livestock holdings are
heavily skewed towards village one and WGI
households in general, the poorer wealth
groups appear to still be losing livestock. It
is unknown if this is due to the sale of livestock
to purchase other assets, which could possibly
be positive, or due to stress sales, or whether
the animals died.
In Badakhshan and Faryab, the livestock rich
sites, the picture is varied. In Badakhshan,
notably in poorer wealth groups, livestock
holdings in cattle, sheep and goats are
increasing from already moderate levels.
Similar changes are to be found in Saripul.
In Faryab, on the other hand, where two of
the villages (village one and two) had the
highest livestock holdings of all the sites,
there appears to have been a depletion of
cattle across all wealth groups. Sheep flocks
have, however, increased by about five
percent from an already high base for higher
wealth groups, but declined overall for the
lowest wealth groups.
Of the women who were reported to have
sole ownership of livestock, there is little
change in livestock holdings. Only three
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animal, while for three other women their
livestock numbers decreased. It should be
noted that those women who do own livestock
normally own only one or two animals. This
may reflect that the animals are used for
dairy produce for household consumption
rather than income generation. It may also
* Unavailable data
Table 15: Changes in livestock holdings
Province/Village WGI WGII WGIII WGIV
Cattle Sheep Cattle Sheep Cattle Sheep Cattle Sheep
Badakhshan
V1 0 -14% -16% -23% 0 -14%
V2 -10% 0 +23% +26% -11% +8%
V3 +9% +17% +57% +19% 0 +27%
-3% -8% +10% +8% +9% +18%
Faryab
V1 -12% +6% 0 +14% -100% -58%
V2 -66% +1.4% +40% - 32% 0 0
V3 -36% -5% -12% -50% 0 +140%
-41% +4% -6% +4% -100% -47%
Ghazni
V1 * * *
V2 * * *
V3 * * *
Herat
V1 +66% -500% 0 0 +20% 0 0 +100%
V2 +66% 0 0 -60% + 25% 0 0 +100%
V3 +50% +500% 0 +200% +50% 0 +50% 0
+71% 0 0 -2% +21% 0 +20% +200%
Kandahar
V1 0 +8% 0 +6% 0 -11%
V2 0 0 -67% -6% -47% -3%
V3 0 0 0 -67%
0 +8% -36% -3% -28% -5%
Laghman
V1 +86% +100% +50% +100% +44% -66%
V2 +150% -50% +100% +500% +25% +70%
V3 0 +400% +44% +70% 0 0
+90% +110% +32% +83% +22% +52%
Saripul
V1 0 +25% -14% +88% 0 +100%
V2 0 -7% +27% 0 0 0
V3 0 +25% +900% +26% 0 0
0% +5% +56% +55% 0 +100%
reflect that livestock management by women
takes place within the compound, which may
possibly limit the number of livestock for
women in some areas to own. On the other
hand, it may reflect the fact that there are
other factors constraining greater
acquisition, ownership and management of
livestock, such as lack of access to credit,
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and lack of female extension and veterinary
workers.
4.7 Differences between villages
The evidence examined thus far has largely
focused on comparative analysis between
sites and between wealth groups.  The aim
of this section is to discuss the differences
that exist between villages within sites.
4.7.1 Differences in village assets and
history
Each village has its own unique history (see
Appendix 1) and, as has already been
discussed, different villages within a district
have access to different natural resources
such as land and water. This access is partly
determined by location along a valley, in
terms of water supply and altitude, by
propensity to drought and/or flooding, as
well as to the history of the villages, including
settlement pattern and conflict over
resources. Access will also be partly
determined by the claims of those in
neighbouring villages, for example, to pasture
or water.42
Access to natural resources both between
households and individuals in each village,
and between villages, partly determines
people’s ability to engage in agriculture. As
has been shown earlier in this report access
to land is often uneven and many households
own no land. However, the extent of
landlessness also differs from village to village.
For example, in village two in Faryab 40
percent of the village was landless, while in
village three 80 percent of the households
in the village are landless.  It is logical that
the impact of agricultural programmes will
differ according to the land ownership
situation.
Christoplos argues that agricultural
programming and policy also needs to be
differentiated by area in terms of its
agricultural potential – commercial farming
should be the focus in high potential areas
and food security the focus in low potential
areas.43 Regardless of this differential
between high and low areas, it will continue
to be important to recognise difference in
access to assets existing between villages in
the same areas as well as between
households. Likewise, it is important to
remember that villages within the same
district have different levels of access to
schools and health care, and that traditional
occupations and skills can vary greatly
between villages in close proximity.  
All of the above factors, together with local
gender relations, household composition and
access to social networks (as well as what is
happening in the rest of the country and the
region) combine to partially determine the
livelihood options available to people within
villages. Villages need to be looked at
separately, as livelihood opportunities and
constraints differ within and between villages,
and thus appropriate interventions will not
be the same.
4.7.2 Differential effects of policies and
power structures
The reliance of villages and individuals on
diverse assets and income sources means that
villages and their inhabitants are differentially
affected by policies, local politics and power
structures. For example, in contrast to many
other villages in the area, in village three in
Laghman, which is a high altitude village,
the majority of villagers have traditionally
been involved in cutting off dead wood for
sale as firewood. Due to a recent ban on the
cutting of wood in the area many of the
villagers, who have very small land and
livestock holdings and extremely low
education levels, have lost one of their main
income sources (see Box 6). While most of
the villagers have been affected by this ban,
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 45
Rethinking Rural Livelihoods in Afghanistanwomen have been especially hard hit, as they
were generally responsible for collecting
firewood for sale. As a result, women were
able to control and manage some of their
earnings, whereas now they have to ask their
husbands for money, which is not always
given.
4.7.3 Wealth differences between villages
In the vast majority of villages wealthier
households are said to be those with larger
land holdings and sometimes businesses,
while the poorest households are those that
rely on daily labour and at times begging.
There are, however, differences between
villages. As noted earlier, the size of land
holdings needed to be deemed wealthy varies
enormously from location to location.
Size of land holdings does not always mean
a village is richer than another that has less
land. The wealth of a village will in part
depend on who owns the land, whether the
land is equitably distributed, the quality of
the land and the availability of resources
such as water. CHA/EOCA, for example, found
that the village they had thought to be the
wealthiest was actually not. The village may
have had much larger land holdings and flocks
of livestock, but the other two villages had
better access to water and pasture. The
combination of assets, and not only the
quantity, is highly important and varies from
village to village.
Similarly, while villages in Faryab and Saripul
have larger amounts of land per village than
villages in other areas, there is a high
proportion of landlessness, which means that
while the village as a whole might appear
wealthier, individual village members may
be worse off.
Having now looked at the main themes
emerging from this project, the next section
outlines the major implications and policy
recommendations that can be drawn from
the above evidence.
Box 6: The politics of wood economy in a village in Laghman
Many of the people of this village, especially the poorest, rely on the collection and sale of wood
from the forests for their income. Different governments, including the agricultural department
of the present government, have asked for a ban on the cutting down of wood to preserve the
forests. However, the people of this village argued against it, as they had no alternative income
source.
More recently, DACAAR staff were involved in trying to have a ban imposed on cutting wood.
DACAAR enlisted the help of a locally respected man who was instrumental in getting five shuras
to agree to a ban. People agreed to the ban for several reasons: DACAAR had always advised them
to, it would assist in preventing flooding, it would aid the storage of irrigation water, provide
trees for construction in the long term, provide fodder, and beautify the area.
While the poor are now unable to sell wood, the more powerful appear to be profiting from the
ban. The brother of a local commander takes one truckload to the Wuliswali everyday. As a result
of the ban the powerful are benefiting, wood is still being cut down, though to a lesser extent,
and many of the poor are considering turning to poppy cultivation. The poor have also turned
to cutting down their own fruit trees for sale, as this is not banned, which further jeopardises
their future livelihoods.
Source: Ghafori, J. 2004
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implications and recommendations from the
findings presented in this paper for policy
and practice in Afghanistan. Particular
reference is made to the implications of the
findings of this project for the two technical
annexes of the Securing Afghanistan’s Future
(SAF) document, which were outlined in
chapter two. The two technical annexes are:
the Social Protection and Livelihoods (LSP)
Annex and the Natural Resources (NR) Annex,
with a focus on the agricultural section.
5.1 Social protection and
livelihoods
5.1.1 Livelihood diversity
The majority of households, both rich and
poor, have diversified income sources and
5. Conclusion: Key Implications and Recommendations
44 This has also been found in other studies. See Ellis, F. Rural Livelihoods and Diversity in Developing Countries. Oxford:
Oxford University Press. 2000.
many are involved in a combination of farm
and non-farm work. This diversity varies from
area to area and needs to be understood in
the local context.
For wealthier households livelihood diversity
is generally a strategy of accumulation, but
diversity of income sources is more of a coping
mechanism for poorer wealth groups.44 That
is, livelihood diversity is a way of dealing
with a lack of work inside a village and the
short-term nature of employment, which is
often linked to seasonality.
For some households or individuals, income
diversity is used as a means of spreading risk,
particularly where income sources are not
connected. This means that the effect of
shocks on one income source, such as in
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although wage levels will be affected in both.
More research is needed into the links
between different income sources and
principally the link between agriculture
growth and the non-farm sector. This is
particularly important to investigate if
agriculture is to be the engine of growth in
Afghanistan.
Recommendations
The Government of Afghanistan (GoA), United
Nations (UN) agencies, donors and NGOs
should ensure that their activities support
the multiple income strategies that poor
households use and not encourage
dependence on one sector, such as
agriculture, as a livelihoods source. One way
forward could be to:
• Design activities that support an entire
household, rather than an individual, to
enable responsibility for income diversity
to be shifted to the household level. This
would result in different household
members engaging in different activities,
rather than each member engaging in
alternate activities. Such an approach
to supporting livelihood diversity
strategies would facilitate the spreading
of risk, while securing the income sources
of individual household members, and
thereby enable households to accumulate
and build up their asset and skill base.
5.1.2 Non-farm Labour
This study found that in 18 out of the 21
villages studied, non–farm labour is the most
important source of income for poorer wealth
groups. The current importance of non-farm
labour in rural Afghanistan has major
implications for the agricultural focus of
much rural programming and policy. The vital
role of non-farm labour in rural Afghanistan
necessitates that action be taken towards
supporting the non-farm sector and improving
people’s abilities to gain employment and
income in this sector.  The current importance
of non-farm labour in rural livelihoods must
be recognised.
Recommendations
The GoA, UN agencies, donors and NGOs must
recognise and support the importance of non-
farm labour in rural livelihoods and look to:
• Monitor over time employment trends
at the local level, specifically the nature
and type of work available, in order to
inform rural policy development and
programming. This will, for example,
mean examining whether the non-farm
sector continues to be as vital to the
poor over time. The NRVA could be one
vehicle through which this could be done.
Mechanisms also need to be put in place
to enable NGOs working at the local level
to feed information on trends in their
area up to the national level.
• Examine and support the skills people
already possess, and develop them
through vocational training combined
with business training, where
appropriate.  This could enable the rural
poor to increase their incomes through
being able to demand higher wages.
• Build an understanding of the skills
needed for non-farm labour for men
and women, both now and in the future,
through labour market research on
current work opportunities as well as
newly developing employment areas.
• Link vocational training to business
and/or marketing training, where
appropriate, to enable people to gain
the maximum income benefit from their
production and income generation
activities. While business training is
mentioned in the LSP Annex, vocational
training is not.
• Play a role in enabling people to
develop existing income generating
activities. This is particularly relevant
to microfinance providers. For example,
microfinance products could be offered
to female carpet weavers in Daulatabad
who since the drought have had to rely
on middlemen to provide raw materials.
As a result, women work more as contract
labour for less return. Credit from
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women to buy their own raw materials
and ideally receive more of the profit of
their labour. For this to be done
successfully possible constraints will need
to be identified, such as if it is possible
for women to sell carpets without
middlemen, given unequal power
relations in the carpet market.
• Explore providing skills training as
part of public works programmes so
that the benefits of involvement in these
programmes outlive the project lifetime.
• Ensure that national programmes
directly benefit women and also
develop women oriented strategies.
National programmes, such as the
National Emergency Employment
Programme (NEEP) and the National
Solidarity Programme (NSP), should both
directly benefit women as well as men,
and where this is not possible separate
strategies to benefit women must be
developed.
5.1.3 Labour migration
Labour migration, both inside and outside
Afghanistan, is a very important income
strategy for over a quarter of households.
For wealthier households labour migration
may be a strategy of accumulation.  For the
poor it is a crucial way of coping with uneven
job opportunities inside the village, or of
seeking better-paid work.  There is, however,
currently insufficient knowledge about how
labour migration works and who is involved.
While the SAF does argue for supporting
migrant workers, it provides no strategy as
to how this will be done. From this research
such strategies could include supporting the
rights and working conditions of migrant
workers and improving people’s skill base,
so that where people need or choose to
migrate they can command higher wages, as
well as providing employment information.
Strategies for supporting those who are unable
to migrate for financial reasons, but for whom
migrant labour could be highly beneficial,
should also be explored. This could include
providing such people with access to credit
for travel costs as well as covering the basic
expenses needed to support those left behind.
Recommendations
The GoA, UN, donors and NGOs alike need
to begin to view migration in a more positive
light, rather than something negative that
should be prevented, and:
• Undertake research on labour
migration to provide a better
understanding of why people migrate,
where they migrate, how they migrate,
what activities they engage in and what
is needed for migration in terms of skills,
information and credit as well as how
those in the source villages are coping.
With this understanding the government
and others could then begin to design
strategies aimed at supporting migrant
labour populations and their families.
5.1.4 Indebtedness
Many households are indebted, rich and poor
alike, and indebtedness is a factor in both
the creation as well as the perpetuation of
poverty. For wealthier households, loans are
often taken either for ceremonies such as
weddings, where a large lump sum is needed,
or for purposes of production or investment.
For poorer households, the majority of loans
are taken out as a coping strategy to meet
basic needs such as food and health care. In
contrast to a loan taken out for productive
purposes (if the production is successful),
copy strategy loans are unlikely to lead to
an improved ability to repay the loan,
recognising, of course, that having healthy
household members is important for work
purposes.
At the moment, many households are able
to access credit, but the majority of loans
come from family and friends. Some
households are indebted through mortgaging
land. These households face the double
challenge of trying to regain their land by
paying off the mortgage, while in some cases
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Credit for the purchase of food and health
care is often essential for the poor. While
recognising that microfinance organisations
do not like to provide such loans, for reasons
of financial sustainability, these types of
loans must be available if microfinance is
really to reach the poorest and play a large
role in social protection.  Providers, with a
large enough portfolio of wealthier clients,
should be able to provide credit to the poor
on terms that enable repayment over time
in small instalments.
Microfinance lenders should, however, be
careful not to disrupt local credit support
mechanisms where they function well. On
the other hand, providing alternative credit
sources could ease the burden of those, often
family members, who lend often quite
substantial sums of money.
Recommendations
Policy makers and practitioners, particularly
from the government and microfinance
providers should:
• Explore and monitor locally existing
credit mechanisms, particularly the
terms and conditions of loans, the
penalties of inability to repay, who is
able to access local credit sources, what
loans are used for, and how loans are
repaid. Interventions should then be
targeted towards those who have
difficulty accessing credit and repaying
loans. If terms and conditions are found
to be highly exploitative then the
possibility of households accessing credit
under fairer terms from microfinance
providers to repay exploitative loans
should be explored.
• Monitor the level of indebtedness,
again possibly through the NRVA, and
identify problem areas in order to prevent
negative coping mechanisms for repaying
debts.
• Consider moving part of the money
currently allocated for targeted
transfers to the poorest to the
MicroFinance Investment and Support
Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA). This
could allow MISFA to target the poorest
population (who may have a high default
rate) with credit to meet their basic
needs. This credit could help protect the
livelihoods of the chronically poor and
could be used to gradually assist them
to improve their livelihoods through the
provision of credit for income generating
purposes.
• Study the possibilities of helping
people recover assets, such as land
held in debt, as well as helping people
accumulate and protect assets. The
possible positive impact of recovery of
assets such as land on reducing incentives
for households to engage in poppy
cultivation should also be explored.
5.1.5 Gender
Recommendations for improving the
livelihoods of both men and women are
included under each sub-heading in this
section, but a separate sub-heading for gender
is warranted given the lack of focus on gender
in both the LSP Annex and the NR Annex.
While there are no doubt initiatives being
undertaken by NGOs in the field, steps
towards increasing the livelihoods of different
types of men and women need to be spelt
out if clear strategies and actions are to be
undertaken. It is unclear how programmes
grouped under LSP, such as NSP and NEEP,
will really benefit women as opposed to men,
and what steps will be undertaken to carry
forward any positive change.
Women have been shown to be involved in
many production and income generating
activities and to contribute to household
income, yet few women own resources such
as land and livestock. Inequities, in terms of
access to resources, are barely mentioned in
either annex, yet these are very real barriers
for many rural women, especially those who
are financially responsible for their households
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sufficient to support a family. It is these
structural inequities that make some female-
headed households particularly vulnerable
to poverty and it is these structural causes
of vulnerability, and not just the symptoms,
that need to be tackled.
Women possess many skills that could and
do provide income, such as carpet weaving,
tailoring, embroidery, livestock management,
and agricultural work such as weeding.
However, due to a lack of recognition of
women’s work in areas of agriculture, or a
lack of business and marketing training, these
activities often generate less income than is
possible.
Recommendations
Policy makers and practitioners from the
government, donors and implementing
organisations need to:
• Protect, support and develop the
livelihoods of women. In this regard,
the government should work with gender
and livelihoods specialists to develop
explicit strategies for women, which
disaggregate how the livelihoods of
women vis-à-vis men can be protected,
supported and developed.
• Recognise and support women’s role
in agriculture at the policy and
programme level.
• Conduct market research before
providing skills training in areas such
as handicrafts, to ensure there is a
market for the goods produced, and
accompany skills training with business
and marketing training where
appropriate, to enable women to obtain
the maximum benefits from their labour.
• Tackle the structural causes of gender
inequity and look beyond traditional
activities, such as poultry farming and
embroidery.
5.1.6 Health
Health accounts for the second largest
expenditure in the majority of households.
Health is very much a livelihoods issue in
that ill health, either physical or mental, has
an enormous impact on livelihoods. It is a
major factor in creating indebtedness as well
as leading to the depletion of assets through
sales to pay for treatment. Ill health also
impacts on livelihoods through the inability
of the person who is ill, and possibly their
carer, to engage in production or income
generating activities. Health is also tied up
with livelihoods through the negative effects
on heath of certain types of income generation
activities, such as carpet weaving or
embroidery. Labour migration may be another
livelihood strategy that has health implications
that need to be addressed. If, for example,
male migrant workers visit sex workers, as
happens in other parts of the world, there
may be a need for health education to these
groups, as well as to others, around HIV and
AIDS awareness.
Despite all of the above, the Ministry of
Health (MoH) is not part of the Livelihoods
and Social Protection Consultative Group (LSP
CG). Health issues also do not appear to be
considered either as a livelihoods or a social
protection issue in the LSP Annex. Instead,
it is assumed that social protection will lead
to greater ability to access health care.  This
fails to take into account several issues:
1. Social protection as currently outlined
in the LSP will do little for the chronically
poor (those unable to help themselves)
in terms of the income generation
strategies incorporated under LSP.
2. Ill health, either physical or mental,
maybe a factor preventing households
from gaining work and may serve to
perpetuate poverty. Participation in
programmes such as NEEP, which are
physically demanding, will require a
certain level of health to begin with and
thus exclude certain households.
Moreover, there are health implications
in participating in physically demanding
work on a poor diet, while such
participation may lead to household food
resources being diverted to those working
on such schemes. These dynamics need
to be better understood.
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3. There is anecdotal evidence that much
of the medication available to households
is ineffective.45
4. Ill health can prevent either the person
who is ill or the person caring for the
sick person from accessing employment
or income.
Recommendations
The government, the LSP CG and/or
implementing organisations should:
• Include the MoH on the LSP CG, as
health is very much a livelihoods and
social protection issue. Improvements in
health care planned under the Health
Technical Annex of the SAF will have an
important impact on livelihoods and
social protection, but it is necessary that
linkages be institutionalised and
understood, if they are to be effectively
acted upon.
• Ensure the chronically poor receive
adequate health care. This should be
done by developing measures that
provide health care under social
protection strategies to those who do
not have access to health care through
participation in programmes such as
NEEP. While it is difficult to know which
needs come first – improvement in health
care or improvements in income enabling
greater access to health care – it appears
that for the chronically poor, who may
be unable to work, health care is a social
protection issue. Similarly, for those who
cannot currently access employment due
to ill health, health care needs to come
first.
• Provide advice on livelihood related
health issues in heath education
activities. For example, for women,
advice should be provided on the need
to rest your eyes when working on
embroidery or carpet weaving, or the
need to wear masks and move around
when weaving carpets and gilims. While
for migrant labourers, and others, it may
be appropriate to provide advice on HIV
and AIDS.
• More closely control pharmaceuticals
and pharmacies to prevent the sale of
ineffective medicine and ensure that
drugs and antibiotics are only available
by prescription. Health education should
also include awareness raising about
ineffective drugs.
5.1.7 Social protection and the “poorest
of the poor”
Most current policy and programmes do not
target the very poor, who are likely to be
those who are unable to work and lack assets.
While the LSP Annex has empowerment of
the most vulnerable as an aim, the
programmes encompassed within the LSP are
unlikely to reach the most vulnerable. Indeed,
the document itself raises the question of
whether to target the “poorest of the poor”
or those closer to the poverty line for whom
a wider range of possibilities, such as
food/cash for work and micro-finance, are
available. Programmes such as NEEP and NAP
appear to be targeting the latter category.
The LSP does mention resource transfers to
the chronic poor, as a “last resort,” but it is
unclear how this will work.
The annex does recognise the need to
understand and work with traditional
mechanisms of support, for those not able
to help themselves, but no strategy for doing
this appears to have been developed. Gaining
an understanding of local support networks
for the poorest is crucial to understanding
whether improvements in the livelihoods of
the less poor are likely to benefit those less
able to help themselves.
This research shows that there does appear
to be a relationship between the wealth of
the less poor and poorer groups.  For example,
a mullah in Herat spoke of how his life had
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relied on alms from others. Those who gave
him alms were badly hit by the drought and
were only able to give him a very small
amount, which was not enough for him to
support his family.  Similarly, in two of the
villages in Kandahar, shura members said that
the amount of alms given to the poorest
members of the community had changed
during and since the drought. In one village,
no alms are given to the poorest now, while
in the other village people reported giving
substantially less to the poor than before the
drought.
Helping wealthier households to give more
to poorer households, as required in Islam,
would not tackle inequitable power
structures, but it could be one way through
which the poorest are targeted.  Separate
strategies to target the poorest will also be
needed.
Recommendations
Policy makers and practitioners in government
ministries and/or NGOs should:
• Target resources to households with
young children in which adults are not
able to work. This may enable the
children of these households to attend
school, rather than work from an early
age, and give them the skills to improve
their livelihoods in the long term.
• Use community workers to raise
awareness of the long-term livelihoods
consequence of women marrying much
older men. This could be one way in
which the vulnerability of women to food
insecurity in later life could be reduced,
although it is likely that such practices
would be reduced if people were not as
poor.
There is also a need to gain more
understanding of the following:
• The extent to which the traditional giving
of alms has been affected by events such
as drought and war and to what extent
these informal social protection systems
are still functioning. It is equally
necessary to determine to what extent
improved livelihoods for some lead to
greater support for the poorest.
• The characteristics of those individuals
and households who are unable to support
themselves. This study found the poorest
to be those who resorted to begging.
Understanding more about the
characteristics of these people and
engaging them in a dialogue would enable
better programme and policy design to
assist them.
• The structural factors that keep people
in poverty and how to break through
them. For example, in the case of female-
headed households a large factor is the
lack of opportunities for women to
engage in income generating activities
that provide sufficient income to support
a family. This is linked to a lack of
ownership of productive assets, such as
land and livestock, which to a large
degree stems from socio-cultural norms
and stigmas that dictate what people
can and should do.
5.2 Agriculture
This study found that a majority of poor
households access most of their grain from
the market or from other means, and that
non-farm labour, rather than agriculture, is
the most important source of income for a
majority of the poorest households. This
raises questions over the accuracy of the
frequently cited “80% of the population are
dependent on agriculture.”  Agriculture plays
a role in the lives of many of the rural poor,
but this research shows that even under
relatively good agricultural production
conditions, agriculture plays less of a role
than other income sources, if any, in many
poor households in different parts of
Afghanistan.
Many of the poorest households are landless
and own few livestock. Women have been
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men. These findings have huge implications
for the assumptions in the NR Annex that
agricultural reconstruction can be equitable,
particularly given that participation in
agriculture is not equitable because of
unequal land ownership between men and
women and households.
There is, moreover, a disjunction between
the recognition of livelihood diversity and
the importance of non-farm labour in the LSP
Annex, and the fact that this is not mentioned
in the NR Annex.  Indeed the latter states
that:
“The overall sector objectives are that
improved livelihoods and economic
conditions of rural families, and enhanced
household food security will result in
their active participation in the national
economic growth that will be guaranteed
through deployment of improved,
efficient and sustainable use of water
resources, agriculture, forestry, rangeland
and other sub-sectors, and based on
adoption of sound environmental
practices.”
The findings of this research have major
ramifications for agricultural policy and
programming, as it demonstrates that the
needs of the rural poor are currently being
missed by this focus on agriculture. For
example, if a household has land through
which support could provide part of household
food needs, then agricultural programming
may play a large direct role. However, unless
households have sufficient land to be able
to sell or trade produce for expenditures,
such as health and other expenses, it is likely
that they will still be involved in non-farm
labour, both to generate cash income as well
as to spread risk.
For those without sufficient land, or land at
all, residing in areas where farm labour
opportunities are lacking and/or poorly paid,
alternative income sources will always need
to be sought. This may be especially the case
for women, and widows in particular, because
as has been shown here, women have less
access to land than men and despite often
being involved in agriculture are rarely
considered in agricultural programming.   
There may be some benefits for poorer
households from improved agricultural
production, such as greater labour demand,
but these are assumptions that are largely
untested. It is possible that agricultural
programming could have the opposite effect,
with higher yields meaning lower food prices,
resulting in lower wages for farm labourers.
(This may be offset by a lack of farm labour
available due to other opportunities, meaning
landlords have to pay higher wages.)
It is recognised that agricultural development
may lead to higher production and thereby
lower prices, enabling the poor greater access
to food; however, this will not necessarily
improve people’s ability to access income to
purchase food. This is not to say that
agricultural programming is of no importance
to the rural poor, but that the extent to which
it has a positive impact will depend from
household to household on asset portfolios.
Recommendations
Policy makers and practitioners need to
recognise the discrepancy between the
realities of rural livelihoods and the policy
and programme focus on agriculture and:
• Distinguish between the asset
portfolios of different households and
individuals in order to understand who
will benefit from agriculture programmes
and who will not. This will help policy
makers and practitioners to better target
resources to those they seek to assist.
• Understand the different natural
resource base which households have
access to before designing agricultural
programmes. Land without water and
livestock without pasture does not make
for productive assets. While livestock
may be an option for women and men
without land, who live in areas with
sufficient common pasture land, it may
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insufficient pasture land. Thus
differentiated programming for different
households is required at the local level.
As well as these broad recommendations,
there are other potential ways in which
agriculture can benefit poor households with
little or no land, and who currently rely
largely on non-farm labour.  While many of
the poor in this study were found to depend
mostly on non-farm labour, agriculture also
forms part of the livelihood strategies of
many.  It is crucial, therefore, that strategies
be explored with a view to supporting
household livelihood diversification, rather
than trying to move households to agriculture
entirely. It is also worth mentioning that the
example of the differential effects of the
wood collection ban in Laghman demonstrates
that there is a need to monitor who gains
and who benefits in conservation attempts.
The following need to be explored (and
monitored to see who benefits):
• What skills and activities people
already have for whom agriculture
represents part of their livelihood
strategy, in order to support and develop
them. For example, women have
livestock management skills yet few
programmes, other than animal
husbandry, assist women. Moreover,
beyond chickens, women are rarely
assisted with livestock as income
generation.  Women’s role in agriculture
must be recognised, supported and
extended where desirable.
• Mobilising resources within a village,
which can be mutually beneficial, such
as where one person looks after the cow
of another and keeps the calf after birth.
Similarly, the possibilities of negotiating
access to common land (where the land
is not used as pasture) for landless men
and women should be explored.
46 Christoplos, op cit.
47 Ibid.
• Providing non-farm opportunities for
large landowning families, which may
thereby provide more opportunities for
poorer households to sharecrop-in land.46
• Harnessing employment opportunities
for the poor, which may arise from
increases in the processing industry.47
• The recruitment of more female
agricultural and veterinary extension
workers to provide training to women
involved in agriculture. This will of course
necessitate ensuring that these women
have appropriate work conditions
including accommodation for women and
toilet facilities.
• Factors that currently constrain the
involvement of the poor in agriculture.
5.3 Livelihoods monitoring
All of these findings demonstrate the
importance of monitoring livelihood trends
and who is benefiting and who is losing: Is
the importance of non-farm labour as a
current phenomenon, because of the amount
of reconstruction or is it a long-term trend?
What effect will agricultural growth have on
the non-farm sector?  The NRVA is one vehicle
through which this monitoring could be done,
but other more qualitative studies will need
to be conducted to fill in gaps in
understanding, while also providing a better
temporal perspective of people’s livelihoods.
Given that many poor rural households appear
to be reliant on the cash economy, the
monitoring of changes in food price and labour
wage rates is crucial. WFP and others are
currently undertaking this monitoring, but it
needs to be ensured that this information is
analysed and shared and that strategies for
using the data are designed. Understanding
more about the factors that affect the
livelihood choices people make, such as
migrating for work, would help us understand
the effects that market price changes may
have on livelihoods.
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the capacity to use such data sets for their
local programming. However, NGOs should
also be involved in some livelihoods monitoring
in their areas of work to ensure their
programmes are relevant to the realities of
those they seek to aid.  This does not
necessarily mean replicating what has been
tried here, but simply trying to obtain a
better understanding of what different people
in a given village are doing and why, and to
look at the constraints and opportunities they
have and monitor how this changes over time.
The majority of the NGOs who participated
in this livelihoods monitoring research project
found what they learned to be very valuable
in assessing whether their programmes were
responding to the realities of people’s lives,
especially those of the poor.  DACAAR, for
instance, found that their agriculturally
focused programmes were missing their target
beneficiary groups to some extent, since the
poorer groups were not dependent on
agriculture and were largely landless. This
has resulted in DACAAR looking at additional
ways of reaching the poor.
NGOs, government and their donors also need
to begin to look more at the outcomes
(effects) of their projects, and where possible
the impacts, rather than focusing largely on
outputs (deliverables). These actors also need
to begin to look at and tackle the causes of
livelihood constraints and not only the
symptoms.  For this to happen, however,
more investment in learning and longer-term
funding than is currently available will be
needed.
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Jurm District, Badakhshan Province
(Adapted from AKDN, 2004)
Village One
This village is located in the centre of Yumgan
sub-district and is nestled in the main valley
surrounded by agricultural land, green and
lush vegetation, with plenty of access to
water (both drinking and irrigation).  Village
one is the wealthiest of all three villages
surveyed and because of its historical
importance it is quite a large and rich village
with its own market, clinic, schools (boys
and a girls school), electricity station, and
an administrative centre that is about 10/15
km away. Until the fall of the Taliban regime
the village was positioned along an important
access route with direct access to the north
that linked it to major markets in both
Baharak and Faizabad, and to the south that
linked it to the Lapis Lazuli mines and the
Panjsher Valley.
Historically village one has been a place of
great importance. It is where one of the
greatest Ismaili leaders, Naser Khesraw, is
buried. Naser Khesraw came to the area from
Mazar-e-Sharif in the year 455 (1076) seeking
to move as far away as possible from the
centres of political power. Upon his arrival
to the area, the village was renamed and
became an important intellectual centre for
a number of years, as he was regarded as a
highly educated man and an important
intellectual thinker. Upon his death the village
lost its importance as an intellectual centre,
however, it remained a strong agricultural
centre and later a strategic village on an
access route during the jihad for the
mujaheddin.
During the Russian invasion of Afghanistan
the people of village one suffered many
Appendices
casualties primarily because of the location
of the village on a primary access route,
linking it to areas like the Panjsher in the
south and further down to Kabul.  In 1359
(1980) the mujaheddin captured village one,
where they were well received, and ultimately
the village became strong supporters of the
movement.
Village one is predominantly a Sunni village,
with only 30 Ismaili families living in it despite
its historical background.
Village Two
Village two lies in the middle sub-valleys in
Jurm District known as Furghominj Valley
with direct access to Baharak District in the
south and the centre of Jurm in the north,
which in turn provide it with direct links to
markets, schools, health facilities and the
administrative centre. However, unlike village
one it has no high schools located in the
village and students need to travel 15-16 km
to reach Baharak. Unlike the two other
villages it has better access to health facilities
because it can reach the Baharak hospital
within three hours by foot. The main water
source of village two is a stream that people
use for both their irrigation and drinking.
Village two is considered to be middle ranking,
not isolated like village three, but much
smaller in size and less wealthy than village
one. Village two is said to have been
established many years ago and like many of
the villages in the district it supported the
mujaheddin and was very much affected over
its course of history by natural disasters such
as the drought.  On two different occasions
in 1322 (1943) and 1349 (1970) the people
of the village lost large numbers of livestock
due to Caw Ghumar,48 and 1349 (1970) again
because of the drought.
48 A disease that kills cows.
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agriculture and livestock, of which poppy has
become a major crop in all households. In
addition to agriculture, village two is known
for its women’s skills in gilim weaving and
all activities related to the production of
gilims from spinning to weaving are a major
part of the household activity shared by men
and women.
Village Three
Village three is located in Khustak Manteqa
of Jurm at a high altitude (one of the higher
villages in the sub-manteqa at 2,330 m) and
is inaccessible by vehicles.  It is a one-hour
walk by foot from the nearest road.  Village
three suffers from the fact that it is very
isolated and the nearest bazaar, clinic, school
and administrative centre are about 40 km
away, nearly nine hours by foot. The main
water source for the village is a stream that
people use for both their irrigation and
drinking. In the months of October and April
villagers are required to collect water from
very far away as the stream dries up.
Village three is the poorest of the three
villages, located on the peripheral/marginal
side of Jurm. This village is one of only three
villages in Jurm District with a religious
minority (Ismaili community) that have
traditionally been oppressed by the elite
power structures.   Village three is said to
have been established about 550 years ago
by people coming predominantly from Zeebok
and Balkh District.
During the communist government of
Afghanistan era the people lost large amounts
of pasture land to a commander of the area
who later gave the land to people from outside
the village. In addition the village suffered
from heavy bombardment and attacks by
different mujaheddin groups.
The basic economy of village three has been
agriculture and livestock, but like many places
in Afghanistan, its residents own more rain-
49 A statement issued by the Agha Khan, Ismaili religious leader, as a rule for guidance.
fed land than irrigated land, which in turn
has led to a lot of loss and suffering from
such events as drought, floods, and Shah Dard
disease (a disease that killed their livestock).
Throughout its history, village three has
suffered more than one drought, which in
turn has resulted in food deficiency, leading
to many of its residents leaving for other
areas in Badakhshan of which only some have
returned.  However, for those residents that
did stay or returned many have had to sell
their land, livestock and other assets to make
ends met. The result today is that most
people have become sharecroppers, as they
have had to sell or mortgage most of their
land.
Village three is different to the other three
villages in the fact that most of its residents
are Ismaili and will claim that they are not
growing poppy because of a Farman49 that
came out prohibiting Ismailis from growing
or using poppy. Even though village three
has not traditionally been a poppy growing
area there is evidence that its residents began
to grow poppy in 2001 as a means to gain
access to credit and regain lost assets.
Jaghatu District, Ghazni Province (Adapted
from CARE, 2004)
Village One
Village one has a population of 130
households, including 25 female-headed
households, and the population is Hazara. It
is at the highest elevation of the three villages
and the furthest away from Ghazni City.  It
is the closest to a water source and thus has
the best access to irrigation and the highest
rate of cultivation, although the village is
prone to flooding.  Village one is considered
to rank second in wealth of the three villages.
Village Two
Village two is also entirely Hazara and contains
100 households, including five female-headed
households. Thirty of these households are
currently living outside the village. It closer
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cultivation than village three. Village two is
considered the wealthiest of the three villages
as the head of the shura has been very
successful in attracting NGO support to the
village and men in some of the households
in WGI are employed by NGOs.
This village has some conflict with both
commanders and kuchis and has severe levels
of joblessness, as do the other two villages.
Village Three
Village three is populated entirely by Turkmen
and contains 115 households, 12 of which are
female-headed.  It is the closest to Ghazni
City.  Village three has the least access to
water for irrigation and other purposes and
has very little land under cultivation. The
village is also prone to flooding. Because of
this it is considered the poorest of the three
villages.
The economies of the three villages are quite
similar. First, households in all wealth groups
in all villages use a mix of income generating
activities to address their needs. These
include agriculture, livestock and their own
labour. From the data and discussions with
staff it emerged that non-farm labour is
perhaps the most significant income
generation activity for households across all
wealth groups in all three villages. Travel to
Ghazni City for casual labour is most common,
followed by travel to Pakistan and Iran. Those
who travel to the latter two places will go
for a season or up to several years. In each
of the villages, a number of the female-
headed households have a male household
head who has been overseas for many years.
Men who travel to these faraway places will
often borrow money to tide their families
over during their absence. On their return,
they repay their debts and use other cash to
meet family needs.
Agriculture is apparently less important in
the economy of all of the villages, though
the level of engagement does vary.  In village
three, agriculture seems to be least important
as the village has the least access to water.
Only five percent of the 2,000 jeribs of
irrigable land is under cultivation. In village
two, with a somewhat closer location to
water sources, approximately 15 percent of
the irrigable land is under cultivation. In
village one, the village closest to the source
of water, up to 30 percent of the land is
under cultivation. In all villages wheat is the
main crop produced, followed by a small
amount of vegetables (potatoes, onions,
alfalfa and others).
Livestock is an important part of the income
generation and consumption strategies for
households across all villages. Wealthier
households tend to own cattle and sheep
while all households own at least a few
chickens. In the past, the villagers sold most
of their livestock for income but the drought
has badly affected their capacity to keep
large numbers of animals (no food or grazing
pasture, limited water). Currently most
families have only a few livestock – the smaller
ruminants (chickens) are consumed while the
less poor families sell the larger livestock
cattle and sheep if they have any in the fall
for cash over winter.  Women in all villages
are involved in income generating activities
both in and outside the home. These include
collecting firewood, wild plants and livestock
management. Many women also have skills
(tailoring, sewing) that could bring the family
extra income.
Pashtun Zargun District, Herat Province
(Adapted from Kerr-Wilson and Ghafori,
DACAAR, 2004)
All three villages were badly affected by
fighting between the communists and the
mujaheddin and also between separate
mujaheddin factions such as that of Juma
Gul Palawan. Many of the mujaheddin
committed terrible atrocities in the village
and villagers were forced to provide food
and ammunition for both. The villages were
attacked by land and air and many fled, but
have since returned.
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Village one is the furthest away from the
road of the three villages. Most villagers are
involved in agricultural activities and the
main crops grown are wheat, vetch, cotton
and millet for pigeons. Villagers have been
unable to grow rice for four years due to a
lack of water. As the village is surrounded
by agricultural land and they do not have any
open pasture to graze their animals in, they
have little livestock. A high school has recently
been constructed near the village.
Village Two
Village two is the richest village of the three
and is the nearest to the road, with the
largest population. Around one-third of the
villagers own orchards, the produce of which
they sell in Herat. There is a school inside
the village as well as shops. Households in
this village are food self-sufficient for a
greater part of the year compared to the
other two villages, with the main crops being
cotton, wheat, vetch, a little rice and
sunflowers.
Village Three
This is considered the poorest of the three
villages and is drier than the others.  While
this village has more land than the other two
villages, there is not enough water to irrigate
it. Plots of land are therefore divided into
two halves with one half being cultivated
one year and the other half the next year.
The main crops grown are wheat and barley.
There are fewer landowners here than in the
other villages and therefore more landless
households, largely because one man owns
300 jeribs, two-fifths of the total land in the
village, and lives in Herat.
The villagers reported problems with over
population and conflicts with kuchis.
Alingar District, Laghman Province (Adapted
from Kerr-Wilson and Ghafori, DACAAR, 2004)
Many of the men from all three villages fought
with the mujaheddin against the communists
and all of the villages suffered in terms of
loss of human life, destruction of homes, the
killing of livestock and the plundering of
valuables. In 1979, the communists bombed
villages one and two, destroying houses and
killing a number of villagers. Two years later,
the communists renewed their offensive,
bombing village three by air and moving tanks
into villages one and two. In village two, to
avoid fighting, many villagers escaped to the
mountains and hid in underground caves,
while others fled on foot to Pakistan. Refugees
began returning to the villages around 1993.
Village One
Village one is situated close to the river on
the valley floor and only about 1,000 m above
sea level. It is the wealthiest of the three
Alingar villages.  At the entrance to the village
there is a small shop owned by one of the
more wealthy villagers, while wheat, rice
and maize can be seen growing. In addition
to privately owned land, there is about 200
jeribs of commonly owned pasture land. The
land around this village is irrigated with water
from the Alingar River and a tributary stream
called Nurullam.
Villagers live in compounds, where households
from the same family live in separate rooms
within the compound.  In some compounds,
income and expenditure are shared between
all members, while in others it is only shared
within households. Unlike village three, the
women of village one belong primarily to the
private world of compounds and are
responsible for housework and childcare. The
men, on the other hand, belong to the public
world and are involved in agricultural
activities, fishing, running shops and collecting
wood. Some men from this village also migrate
to Pakistan for casual labour.  It is a
predominantly Pashtun village, although there
are a few Pashaie households.
Village Two
Village two is on the same side of the river
as village one, but thirty minutes away in
the direction of Mehterlam. The village sits
on a mountain slope in a side valley called
Sangar. The people in the village seem more
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villages, as the village has been seriously
affected by drought. Land in the village is
irrigated by spring water and in normal
conditions rice, mulberries and apples are
grown. However, because of the drought the
orchards are bare and there is not enough
water to grow much rice. According to the
villagers, the lack of water has meant that
they have had to grow alternative crops,
including cotton and poppy.
Like the other two villages, some men spend
long arduous hours going to far away
mountains to collect wood, while due to a
lack of available work in the village others
travel to Pakistan or Iran for casual labour.
As a result, the Pakistani rupee supplements
the Afghani as the currency for many
transactions. Women in this village do not
collect wood, but do take part in agricultural
activities alongside their male relatives.
Some women also accompany their male
relatives to Pakistan and work as agricultural
labourers or do piecework, such as putting
together factory toy cars, at home.
Village Three
Village three is a 20-minute walk up a narrow
path between terraced fields; it is a beautiful
place, about 1,450 m above sea level, where
houses jostle against each other on narrow
mountain shelves.
Village three is the poorest of the three
Laghman villages with most households owning
less than a jerib of land, although many
households, even landless ones, have walnut
trees whose nuts and wood they trade. Wheat
is the main crop grown in the village, while
a little maize is grown when there is enough
water in the tributary river.
This is a Pashaie village, where young men
loll around on the sides of pathways, their
eyes rimmed with kohl, hair dyed bright
orange with henna. Kalashnikovs decorated
with flowers can be seen in the village and
highlight the presence of local commanders.
Women with handmade beaded necklaces
and brightly coloured, tatty dresses, are seen
outside working in the fields and carrying
heavy baskets of wood down from mountain
forests to the wood bazaar. Gender relations
in this village and in other Pashaie villages
are different from many places elsewhere in
rural Afghanistan. Women can move freely
within the village from house to house,
although they do need the permission of male
relatives to travel outside the village.
Daulatabad District, Faryab Province
(Adapted from EO/CA and CHA, 2004)
Daulatabad District is located 70kms, some
two and a half hours drive, north of Maimana,
the provincial capital of Faryab, on the main
road to Andkhoi. The distinguishing geographic
features of the district are a wide plain area
in the centre with surrounding low-lying clay
hills, which constitutes a substantial area of
rain-fed cultivation.
Village One
Village one is believed to have been
established in the 1860s and is entirely
populated by Pashtuns with residents originally
coming from Qalat, Zabul Province. Settlers
were livestock owners who migrated
seasonally to graze their livestock.  After the
drought of 1971 when 80 percent of their
livestock was lost they started cultivation of
land on a larger scale. The village population
was estimated by the village shura to be
2,050 families (10,000 individuals) in 2003.
Village one is ranked the poorest of the three
villages.  Although crop production is common
in the village and crops grown are wheat,
sesame, melon and watermelon, village one
has an identity of traditional livestock owners.
Village one was attacked and plundered during
1989 by a militia commander supporting the
communist regime and 6,700 sheep and goats
were taken away.  During that period villagers
were displaced to Badghis Province and Tur
Ghundy in Herat Province until 1998, when
the Taliban took control of the area.
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contribution to the family economy in
comparison to villages two and three,
although they participate in seasonal
migration during the spring season for grazing
animals, where they make dairy products.
Women in village one also weave gilims that
are rarely sold, but instead are given as a
dowry by a bride’s family or kept as family
asset.
Village Two
Village two is thought to have been
established in the early 1800s by the first
influx of a tribe from Turkmenistan into the
area.
Village two is comprised of 95 percent
Turkmen and five percent Arab and Uzbek
families. The village has a population of 980
families (6,000 individuals). Some 200 families
fled to Pakistan during 1998-2001 due to
security and drought, from which 150 already
returned to the village.
Crops grown in the village are wheat, sesame,
melon and watermelon.  Land is cultivated
every other year with wheat being the major
crop. Grapes and raisins are also produced
in the village. The village is located along
the irrigation system between the other two
villages under study, however, irrigation water
is only accessible in early spring and winter.
Women play a considerable role in the family
economy largely through generating income
from carpet weaving.
Village Three
Village three is believed to have been
established in the early 1700s and is made
up of 85 percent Uzbek families, nine percent
Turkmen and eight percent Arab families.
The village population is around 550 families
(3,300 individuals).  Settlers originally came
from Maimana, Andkhoi, Sheberghan of
Jawzjan Province and Balkh Province.
Village three has suffered from factional
fighting taking place between warlords
backing the Soviet regime staying in the
village and mujaheddin from the village and
neighbouring villages, which deprived them
of access to their land and pastures outside
the village during 1983-1992.
Village three is ranked in the middle in terms
of wealth among the three villages and women
have a considerable role in the family
economy by earning income from carpet
weaving.
Crops grown in the village are wheat, sesame,
melon and watermelon.  Land is cultivated
every other year with wheat being the major
crop and others acting as secondary crops.
Grapes and raisins are other agricultural
products produced in the village. 
Sayyad District, Saripul Province  (Adapted
from GAA, 2004)
Village Two
This is an Uzbek village and is located some
23 km away from Saripul centre in the upper
part of the valley in a hilly area. The local
economy is livestock based. The village has
more irrigated land than village two. Wild
plant collection is an important activity for
households.
Villagers said that the village is some 200
years old. War resulted in repeated
destruction, flight and return to the village
over the past 20 to 25 years. A flood also cost
the lives of many children and animals and
destroyed much of the village, the road and
the flourmill. In 1363 (1984) internal fighting
between different commanders, tribal groups
and ethnic groups started. During the
repeated bombardments the population
migrated to Kohistanat and to Pakistan or
Iran to live a life in poverty and destitution
there.  Following the fall of the Taliban regime
80 percent of the families returned to the
village, with the remaining 20 percent still
in Pakistan.
Village Two
Village two is mostly inhabited by an Arab
and Pashtun population and is some 7 km
away from Saripul centre.  It is characterised
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compared to village three, this village has
less land and many people do supplement
their income by labour migration.
Village Three
Since the market in Saripul is near, there is
no market in village three. However, there
are shops offering goods for basic household
needs, a pharmacy is available, and some
shops selling agricultural inputs are available.
Agriculture is characterised by rain-fed and
irrigated cultivation (wheat, barley, melons,
sesame, flax, vegetables, maize). Some
gardens have poplar trees that are used for
building purposes, but are also sold at times.
The area is also known for gilim weaving and
hat production.  The village is some 200 years
old.
Villagers recall bombardments during the
Russian occupation (1361/1982) and
mentioned that all houses were destroyed in
the events and people lost animals. Many
migrated to the Kohistanat area and were
forced to earn their livelihoods through daily
labour, since the only assets that were
remaining were animals for transporting
goods.
After a short period of control by the
mujaheddin between 1362 (1983) and 1365
(1985), some of the migrants returned and
tried to rebuild their houses and livelihoods
but the village was again taken over by
government forces in alliance with Russians.
Villagers again lost orchards, livestock and
houses, and migrated again to Kohistanat and
to Pakistan only to return some six years
later. When the Taliban took over the village
in 1377 (1998) three-quarters of the
population migrated to Pakistan and again
sold their assets for livelihood. After the fall
of the Taliban regime in 1381 (2001) 85
percent of the population returned. The
infrastructure of the village was destroyed
and the villagers faced difficulties in accessing
safe drinking water, shelter and restocking
their livestock herds.
Kandahar District, Kandahar Province
(Adapted from MC village descriptions)
Village One
Village one is entirely populated by Pashtuns
from five different tribes and has a population
of 100 families (several households within
one compound).
The village was heavily hit by the Russian
bombardment in 1982 and again in 1984
during which time most of the villagers
migrated, some to Pakistan and some to other
villages in the south.  In 1992 many people
returned to the village but faced many
difficulties as the village was heavily mined
and 12 people were killed by landmines.  De-
miners worked in the village for 2 years.
During that time there were no work
opportunities within the village.
The village is traditionally known for good
production of crops such as wheat. However,
during the drought many of the villagers lost
livestock and people’s orchards dried up.
Those who previously worked as farmers and
farm labour could not continue such work
due to a lack of water and many are now
involved in daily labour.
Village Two
Six Pashtun tribes as well as a small number
of Tajik families populate village two.  The
village has a population of 260 families.
The village had a similar history of events as
village one with heavy destruction and
casualties from the Russian bombardments.
In 1980, 120 villagers were taken prisoner by
the Terakai regime and 60 were killed, leaving
many women widowed.   Many of the villagers
fled the area and 60 families are still in
Pakistan and Iran.
This village has fertile land but now produces
very little due to a lack of water.  Fifty
families used to be involved in sharecropping
before the drought but are now unable to
due to this lack of water.  The landless are
now involved in daily labour.
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Village three is populated by seven Pashtun
tribes and is made up 170 families.  Village
three also has a similar history to villages
one and two and also suffered huge damages
and casualties from the Russian
bombardments that left 35 people in the
village disabled and unable to work. Most of
the villagers fled during the fighting as well
as during the drought and 100 of the 170
families have still not returned.
As with village one this village was famous
for its good agricultural production, but since
the drought little cultivation has taken place
and many people who had once worked in
agriculture now work as daily labourers, often
in Kandahar City, where they can go and
return the same day.
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(No. of months food self-sufficient from one production and main cash income source by
wealth group, by village by district.)
Wealth Grain Budget No. months Main source of
Province/ Group food self- cash income
Village Majority grain Majority grain sufficient
from own from market or from own
production other produce
Jurm District, Badakhshan
1 x 8 Farm labour
Village One 2 x 5 Farm labour
3 x 0 Non-farm labour
1 x 10 Farm sales
Village Two 2 x 7 Farm sales
3 x 2 Fl/fs.nfl/credit
& loan
1 x 6 Farm sales
Village Three 2 x 3 Farm sales
3 x 1 Farm sales
Daulatabad District, Faryab
1 x 12 Farm sales
Village One 2 x 10 Livestock
3 x 6 Remittances/Nfl
1 x 12 Farm sales
Village Two 2 x 10 Farm sales
3 x 6 Non-farm labour
1 x 12 Farm sales
Village Three 2 x 9 Farm sales
3 x 6 Non-farm labour
Jaghatu District, Ghazni
1 x 3 Non-farm labour
Village One 2 x 1 Non-farm labour
3 x 0 Non-farm labour
1 x 2 Non-farm labour
Village Two 2 x 20 days Non-farm labour
3 x 0 Non-farm labour
/credit and loans
1 x 1 Non-farm labour
Village Three 2 x 5 days Non-farm labour
3 x 0 Non-farm labour
Pashtun Zargun District, Herat
1 x 7-8 Farm
Village One 2 x 4-5 Sales/livestock
3 x 2-3 Non-farm labour
4 x 0 Non-farm labour
Non-farm labour
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Village Two 2 x * Farm sales
3 x * Non-farm labour
4 x 0 Non-farm labour
1 x 12 Farm sales
Village Three 2 x 9 Farm sales
3 x 2 Non-farm labour
4 x 0 Nfl/credit & loans
Kandahar District, Kandahar
1 x * Farm sales
Village One 2 x * Non-farm labour
3 x * Non-farm labour
1 x 2-3 Non-farm labour
Village One 2 x * Non-farm labour
3 x * Non-farm labour
Village Three 1 x * Non-farm labour
2 x * Non-farm labour
Alingar District, Laghman
1 x 6 Farm
Village One: 2 x 3-4 sales/livestock
3 x 0 Non-farm labour
Non-farm labour
1 x 3-4 Non-farm labour
Village Two: 2 x 1 Non-farm labour
3 x 0 Non-farm labour
1 x * Non-farm labour
Village Three: 2 x * Wood
3 x * Wood
Sayyad District, Saripul
1 x * Non-farm labour
Village One 2 x 5 Non-farm labour
3 x 0 Non-farm labour
1 x 12 Livestock
Village Two 2 x 6 Livestock
3 x 4 Non-farm labour
4 x 0 Non-farm labour
1 x 12 Non-farm labour
Village Three 2 x 6 Non-farm labour
3 x 0 Non-farm labour
* Unavailable data
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Synthesis Paper SeriesADB Asian Development Bank
Afs  Afghanis is the currency of Afghanistan, and 50 Afghanis is roughly equivalent
to US$1
AKDN Aga Khan Development Network
CARE Care International
CHA Coordination for Humanitarian Assistance
DACAAR Danish Committee for Assistance to Afghan Refugees
EOCA Ecumenical Office of Christian Aid
GAA German Agro Action
GoA Government of Afghanistan
LSP Livelihoods and Social Protection 
LSP CG Livelihoods and Social Protection Consultative Group
LSP PIP Livelihoods and Social Protection Public Investment Programme
MC Mercy Corps
MISFA Microfinance Investment and Support Facility for Afghanistan
MoH Ministry of Health
MRRD  Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
NABDP National Area Based Development Programme
NDF National Development Framework
NEEP National Emergency Employment Programme
NGO Non-governmental organisation
NR Natural Resources
NRVA National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment
NSP National Solidarity Programme
NSS National Surveillance System
UN United Nations
WFP World Food Programme
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